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Imagine this scenario: you are driving to work and running
very late. Up ahead, you see a yellow light that you know will be
red by the time you reach the intersection. Because you are in
such a hurry to get to work, you decide to run the red light. Lo
and behold! A pedestrian walks in front of your car; you are
unable to brake in time; and you kill the pedestrian.
For causing this death, you are guilty of criminal homicide.'
However, the degree of your offense, i.e., whether it is murder,
manslaughter, or negligent homicide, depends on your mental
state with regard to causing the death.2 What was your mens rea?
Well, clearly it was not purpose or knowledge. It was not your
conscious object to kill the pedestrian, nor did you believe that
it was practically certain that you would kill the pedestrian.3
Were you reckless? Under the Model Penal Code, to be reck-
less, an actor must consciously disregard a substantial and unjusti-
Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers University, School of Law (Camden). Trial At-
torney, U.S. Department ofJustice, 1997-2000. For comments on drafts of this article,
I am grateful to Larry Alexander, Michael Carrier, Joshua Dressier, Heidi Hurd,
Dennis Patterson, Ken Simons, and Rick Singer. Further thanks are due to Michelle
Anderson, Kevin Cole, Mayer Freed, Len Packel, Paul Robinson, and Richard Turk-
ington for their insightful criticisms made during my "job talk" visits and presenta-
tions. Finally, thanks are due to the participants of the junior faculty workshop at
Rutgers-Camden.
' See MODEL PENAL CODE (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (hereinafter
MPC] § 210.1 (defining criminal homicide). As set forth, the hypothetical establishes
that this death was more than accidental, and no justifications or excuses obtain.
2 See MPC § 210.2 (defining murder as a purposeful or knowing homicide or one
evidencing recklessness with extreme indifference to human life); MPC § 210.3 (de-
fining manslaughter as reckless homicides and those committed under extreme men-
tal or emotional disturbance); MPC § 210.4 (defining negligent homicide as
negligently caused killings).
3 See MPC §§ 2.02(2) (a)-(b) (defining "purpose" and "knowledge").
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fiable risk.4  Thus, for you to have been reckless here, you must
have consciously disregarded the substantial and unjustifiable risk
that you could kill someone as a result of your actions. But you
did not engage in this mental calculation. While you knew that
there was some inherent danger in running the red light,5 you
certainly never thought, "well, I might kill someone but I am go-
ing to run that light anyway.""
And indeed, there are those risk-takers who do consciously
disregard the possibility of killing someone and therefore are
reckless as defined by the Model Penal Code. Some people do
engage in risky behavior, fully acknowledging the possibility that
their actions could cause substantial and unjustifiable harm to
others. I will refer to a person whose mental state satisfies the
Model Penal Code's definition of recklessness as being "purely
reckless."
Since your mental state does not fall within the Model Penal
Code's definitions of purpose, knowledge, or recklessness, the
Model Penal Code then leaves us with negligence. Were you sim-
ply negligent? Were you merely unreasonably unaware of the
substantial and unjustifiable risk that you were presenting?8 No,
you were more than negligent. Compared to a negligent actor,
who, for example, changes the radio station and is thus unrea-
' See MPC § 2.02(2) (c) ("a person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of
an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct."). But see David M. Treiman, Reck-
lessness and the Model Penal Code, 9 AM.J. CRIM. L. 281, 365 (1981) (noting that the actor
may only need to be aware of the substantiality, not the unjustifiability, of the risk); cf
Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L.
REv. 931, 934-35 (2000) (arguing that the unjustifiability, not the substantiality, of the
risk does all the work in recklessness).
' Did you see the pedestrian? Let us assume that the layout of the intersection
prevented you from seeing the pedestrian before he stepped into the intersection,
but you were aware of the blind spot itself. If need be, assume that you decided to
make a right turn without stopping at the red light.
6 Cf Dan W. Morkel, Comment, On the Distinction Between Recklessness and Conscious Neg.
ligence, 30 AM.J. OF COMPAR. LAw 325, 331 (1982):
The man who stops at a stop sign, sees the oncoming traffic, but decides that with his modem
powerful car he will make it, does not necessarily intend a collision to occur. It is, at any rate,
clear that he did not take time to contemplate in detail the possibilities of his conduct. His deci-
sion may have been taken almost at impulse.
7 Russian roulette is a classic example of this type of recklessness. There, the substan-
tiality of the risk is clearly defined-there is a one in six chance of death. Thus, the actor
who chooses to pull the trigger knows and disregards that substantial and unjustifiable
risk.
' See MPC § 2.02 (2) (d) (defining "negligence").
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sonably unaware that he is even running the light, much less pos-
ing the risk of killing pedestrians, you are certainly more culpable.
You were fully cognizant of the fact that you were running the red
light and that your action presented some inherent danger.
So what do we do with you when your sense of the risk was
opaque? You knew that your conduct was "risky" or "dangerous,"
but failed to advert to and consciously disregard the specific rea-
son why your conduct was dangerous and risky (because death
might result). I will refer to your mental state as "opaque reck-
lessness."9
Why is this puzzle so important? Currently, the Model Penal
Code uses recklessness as the minimum level of culpability for
most crimes.'0 Yet opaquely reckless actors do not fall within the
" While I use the red light as a proxy for the dangerousness that the driver disre-
gards, my analysis in no way depends on the actor's violation of any statute. An actor
is opaquely reckless whenever he engages in an activity consciously recognizing that
that activity is dangerous, but fails to consciously disregard the exact harm that might
materialize. But a statutory violation is not itself sufficient. That is, the actor may vio-
late a statute, particularly a traffic law, without being reckless (or even negligent) vis-
.-vis any risk of harm. Accord State v. Cox, 500 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Iowa 1993) (reversing
conviction for vehicular homicide where the defendant ran a stop sign but there was
no showing of recklessness); State v. Collins, 616 N.E.2d 224, 226 (Ohio 1993) (stat-
ing that a traffic violation cannot serve as underlying misdemeanor for misdemeanor-
manslaughter); Commonwealth v. Clauser, 239 A.2d 870, 872 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1968)
(holding a traffic violation cannot serve as a basis for involuntary manslaughter ab-
sent a showing of "culpable behavior" or "reckless disregard for the safety of others").
Of course, the actor's knowledge that he is violating a statute may make it more likely
that he is opaquely reckless.
10 See MPC § 2.02(3); see also Treiman, supra note 4, at 285 ("Recklessness is the
most complex, most utilized, and probably the most critical of the four kinds of cul-
pability. Recklessness is the most critical because for many crimes it defines the
minimum level of culpability, thus making the difference between acquittal and con-
viction.") (footnotes omitted); Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State,
71 S. CAL. L. REv. 953, 959 (1998) ("Recklessness is the most common level at which
criminal liability attaches, and is considered the 'default' requisite mental state in
manyjurisdictions when a statute is silent regarding the requisite mental state."); Paul
H. Robinson & Jane A. Grail, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model
Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 701 (1983) ("[R]ecklessness is generally
accepted as the theoretical norm.").
Moreover, theorists advocate expanding the reach of recklessness. See Larry Alex-
ander and Kimberly D. Kessler, Mens Rea and Inchoate Crimes, 87 J. CR, . L &
CaNOLOGY 1138 (1997) (advocating expanding the mens Yea required for solicita-
tion to recklessness, but eliminating incomplete attempts and conspiracy); Sanford H.
Kadish, Reckless Complicity, 87J. CRmL L. & CRImNOLoGy 369 (1997) (arguing as a mat-
ter of principle that recklessness should suffice for complicity for reckless crimes).
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ambit of the Model Penal Code, and, thus, their behavior falls
outside the boundaries of most crimes.
Indeed, consider the death of Morgan Pena, a 2-4 year-old
killed by a driver using a cell phone. The driver, distracted by di-
aling the phone, ran a stop sign and collided with the Pena's car,
killing Morgan. The driver received two citations, for careless
driving and for failure to observe a stop sign, and was fined $50.
The driver was not charged with homicide by vehicle because the
police determined that the driver was not reckless, only careless, a
result that appears to be correct according to the Model Penal
Code's definition of recklessness."
But perhaps the question should have been whether the
driver was opaquely reckless-did he recognize that driving while
dialing a cell phone was a dangerous thing to do? Should the
driver escape responsibility for the death because he never
thought, "if I use this cell phone, I may become distracted, run a
stop sign, and kill a small child?"
Hence, people who knowingly engage in risky behavior but
fail to think through why their actions are "risky" or "bad" or
"dangerous," may not be subject to any criminal responsibility.
Yet, by their choices to engage in dangerous actions, these peo-
ple have shown themselves to be culpable, and thus deserving of
punishment, as well as deterrable, since they know the
dangerousness of their acts and therefore can decide whether to
commit those acts. Consequently, if we believe that opaque reck-
lessness should suffice for criminal responsibility, either we need
to expand the definition of recklessness to include opaque reck-
lessness or we must create a new mental state.
Moreover, the flip side also presents a problem. That is, the
law, in its current state, presents the danger that opaquely reckless
people are being treated as purely reckless, and hence, our crimi-
nal justice system may be treating them as more culpable than
they actually are. For example, South Dakota's Supreme Court
"See Lisa Kozleski, A Year After Morgan Lee Died, Wireless Phones Still a Hot Issue; Death of
2-Year-Old Bucks County Girl Drew Attention to Careless Driving Because of Devices, ALLENTOWN
MORNING CALL, Nov. 3, 2000, at A8; John P. Ferry, Cell-Phone User Won't Face Criminal
Charges in Death; Quaketown Driver 'Careless,' but Not Reckless, Investigators Conclude,
ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Nov. 12, 1999, at B8.
12 It may be true that in a jurisdiction that has enacted both negligent and reckless
homicide statutes, regardless of which crime the defendant is convicted, the defendant's
sentence could very well be the same. Nevertheless, we should not discount the true co-
[Vol. 9 1
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suggested that merely being aware of the dangerous nature of
one's conduct will suffice for manslaughter; the defendant need
not foresee death as a result.13  But doesn't it matter why the
opaquely reckless actor thinks his conduct is dangerous? What
if he never foresees the prospect that someone might die?
Should the disregard of "dangerousness" suffice for responsibil-
ity for manslaughter?
Finally, for theorists who believe that results do not matter for
blameworthiness and punishability," responsibility rests upon the
actor's choice. While many theorists advance this argument in
the context of attempts and completed crimes, few focus on the
result that this argument would have for reckless actors. That is,
such a theory commits one to holding that the reckless driver
who does not kill someone should be held as responsible as the
reckless driver whose conduct results in death. But what do we
hold the opaquely reckless actor to have risked? With opaque
recklessness, what the actor chose to risk, and therefore what he
should be held accountable for, is, well, opaque.
In this Article, I contend that opaque recklessness presents
both descriptive and normative challenges to the Model Penal
Code's definition of recklessness. Before meeting these chal-
lenges head-on, however, in Part I, I discuss whether opaque
recklessness can be resolved without rethinking recklessness by
nundrum presented by opaque recklessness and sacrifice doctrinal consistency at the al-
tar of equal results.
's State v. Olsen, 462 N.W.2d 474 (S.D. 1990) (affirming dismissal of indictment
where driver of tractor failed to yield right-of-vay, causing a car-accident and the im-
mediate death of the other driver, and there was no evidence indicating the defen-
dant had acted in reckless disregard for the safety of the other driver, but noting that
to establish recklessness, "[wihile the State need not introduce evidence that Olsen
could foresee a death resulting from his conduct, the State must introduce evidence
that would allow a trier of fact to conclude that Olsen was au-are of the dangerous na-
ture of his conduct").
" I am among the theorists who believe this. &:e Kimberly D. Kessler, Comment, T/*e
Role of Luck in the Criminal Law, 142 U. PA. L REv. 2184 (1994). But I am far from alone
in this position. See also, ag., HmtAN GROSS, A TmEoRYoF CRzuNJL'SncE 423-24 (1979);
Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpabili,, 5 J. CoNMxiP. L IssUEs 1 (1994); La%, rence C
Becker, Criminal Attempt and the Theoo , of the Law of Crimes, 3 PHiL & PUB. AFFAms 262-76
(1974);Joel Feinberg, Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts: Some Bad but InsnrudWe Argu-
ments Against It 37ARm L REv. 117 (1995);JamesJ. Gobert, 77we Fortuiy ofConsvquencA 4
CRI. LF. 1 (1993); Sanford H. Kadish, The Criminal Law and the Ludc of the Draw, 84J.
CRIL L & CRImINOLOGY 679 (1994); Richard Parker, Blame, Punishment, and the Rote of
Reut 21 Am. PHIL. Q. 269-70 (1984); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A
Critique of the Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L RE%. 1497
(1974); Michael Zimmerman, Luck and MoralResponsibility, 97 ETics 374 (1987).
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collapsing opaque recklessness within the current framework of
the criminal law. After concluding that opaque recklessness
cannot be so resolved, in Part II, I explore the work of R.A. Duff
and Kenneth Simons-both of whom have advanced a broader
definition of recklessness,'5 a definition that encompasses the
concept of practical or culpable indifference-to determine
whether opaque recklessness falls within the scope of their analy-
ses. After reaching the conclusion that an indifference theory is
inherently problematic and therefore is an unsatisfying solution
to the problem, in Part III, I argue that we should rethink what
we mean by "consciously disregarding" in the Model Penal Code's
definition of recklessness. That is, I suggest that while the
opaquely reckless actor is aware that he is taking a "dangerous"
risk on a conscious level, on a preconscious level, the actor may be
aware of the meaning of that "dangerousness," e.g., that death
may result. I then discuss the normative implications of this
conclusion and aver that an opaque choice, where part of the
description of the risk exists on a preconscious level, is still suffi-
ciently the product of the actor's practical reasoning so as to jus-
tify holding the actor accountable for it. After concluding Part III
by exploring the relationship between the preconscious and re-
sponsibility, in Part IV, I turn to the doctrinal implications for
opaque recklessness.
I. CAN OPAQUE RECKLESSNESS BE RESOLVED WITHIN THE CURRENT
FRAMEWORK OF THE CRIMINAL LAw?
The natural response to opaque recklessness is to deny the
problem. Since the criminal law has at its disposal many meth-
ods of snaring culpable actors within its grasp, perhaps we al-
ready have the tools to solve the opaque recklessness dilemma.
We might decide that if the actor chooses to risk "harm" and the
harm turns out to be "death," we should simply substitute
"harm" for "death" with regard to the defendant's mens rea, thus
holding the opaquely reckless actor responsible for choosing to
risk the death that does occur. Alternatively, we should con-
sider whether this is simply a matter of "time framing," and if we
," This characterization of Simons' argument is a bit simplistic as will be discussed
infra section II.B.1. Simons does not advocate broadening the concept of recklessness
as Duff does, but rather, advances an entirely new mental state hierarchy, with culpa-
ble indifference as its own mental state. Nevertheless, the question remains whether
culpable indifference, however characterized, untangles opaque recklessness.
602 [Vol. 91
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look back in time, we will find a (transparent) culpable choice
on which we can place responsibility. We might even say that
the choice not to analyze the risk is equivalent to a willful blind-
ness of sorts. After all, we do place responsibility on an actor
who does not "know" a material fact exists as required by a stat-
ute, where we believe that the actor made a culpable choice not
to know of the existence of the fact. In this section, I will discuss
these alternatives and demonstrate that neither substitution nor
a time framing/willful blindness analysis can cast light through
the opacity.
A. SUBSTITUTION
Let's first look at substitution. Can we substitute the harm
the opaquely reckless actor does foresee-i.e., an amorphous dan-
ger or risk-for the actual harm that materializes-e.g., death, in-
jury, property damage? In the case of the opaquely reckless actor
who runs a red light and hits a pedestrian, can we not say that the
opaquely reckless actor chose to risk "harm"; the harm turned out
to be "death"; and therefore, the opaquely reckless actor chose to
risk "death?"
The criminal law certainly has taken such an approach at
times. For example, an Ohio court held that a defendant who
left his wife violated a statute making it a crime for a husband to
abandon his pregnant wife. 6 There, the defendant intended to
leave his wife, his wife, unbeknownst to him, was pregnant, and
therefore the court held him responsible for leaving his preg-
nant wife. Or, take the natural and probable consequences doc-
trine in accomplice liability. If the defendant intends to aid one
crime, and the principal commits another crime that naturally
and probably flows from the commission of the crime the de-
" White v. State, 185 N.E. 64 (Ohio Ct. App. 1933). Whie is, of course, an example
of the moral-wrong doctrine in mistake-of-fact. This doctrine allows a defendant to
be punished for a crime, without knowledge of a material fact, if the defendant's
conduct, even without such knowledge, is morally wrong. Hence, White ,-as morally
wrong in leaving his wife; thus, even though he did not know she was pregnant, he
can be held accountable under a statute making it criminal to leave one's pregnant
wife. Clearly, such a forfeiture rule is troubling, as it usurps the legislature's role,
making a defendant's choice to engage in a moral (but not legal) wrong criminal
while ignoring the defendant's lack of mens rea as to the very aspect of the crime that
makes the conduct criminal. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDE AMING CRt.BML LAI,
§ 12.0[B] [3] (2d ed. 1995).
2001]
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fendant aided, the defendant is likewise held responsible for the
17additional crime.
Despite vestiges of this approach in the common law,'8 we
cannot rely on such a solution, as it misunderstands mental
states and demonstrates a willingness to punish people dispro-
portionate to their culpability. Let us begin by noting that men-
tal states-beliefs, desires, intentions-all have intentional objects.
We do notjust believe, desire, or intend. Rather, we believe X; we
desire Y; and we intend Z. Now, in the world outside our minds,
there may be many descriptions for X, Y, and Z. For example, an
item, "X," may be (1) a red shirt; (2) an item yielding $2 of profit
for Clothing Corporation; and (3) a product made by child slave
labor in a foreign country. All of these descriptions may refer to
item X.
Yet, in our minds, when we believe, desire, or intend some-
thing, we do not believe, desire, or intend all of the possible de-
scriptions of that intentional object. Thus, when Julia goes to the
mall and she decides to buy item X, she may simply intend to buy
a red shirt. Likely, she has no belief, desire, or intention to affect
Clothing Corporation's profits. She could also firmly believe (al-
beit incorrectly) that item X was manufactured in the United
States by employees paid handsomely for their efforts. Therefore,
we cannot attribute the other descriptions of item X to Julia's in-
tended purchase. We cannot substitute one description of an in-
tentional object for another, even if the two descriptions are
equivalent in the real world.'9
17 See, e.g., People v. Luparello, 231 Cal. Rptr. 832 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (defendant
intends to aid assault; principal departs from common design and kills victim; court
holds that because the defendant intended to aid the assault, the defendant is re-
sponsible for the first degree murder that was committed). Several states have
adopted this rule by statute. See Kadish, supra note 10, at n.1 1.
" For examples of other areas where the criminal law applies substitution-
forfeiture principles, see Michael S. Moore, Intentions and Mens Rea, in ISSUES IN
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 245, 264 (Ruth Gavison ed., 1987) (suggesting
other areas such as felony-murder, grievous bodily harm murder, and mayhem).
" SeeRebecca Dresser, Culpability and Other Minds, 2 CAL. INTERDISCnLINARYL.J. 41, 81
(1993) (arguing that "[i]ntentional states have an important logical property called 'ref-
erential opacity' or 'non-transparency"' and "[u]nlike other informational statements,
the truth or meaning of intentional statements can change if a word or phrase is re-
placed by another that objectively refers to the same thing."). See generally WILLIAM VAN
ORMAN QUINE, FROMALOGICALPOINTOF VMW 139-159 (2d ed. rev. 1980) (discussing ref-
erential opacity).
This puzzle plagued criminal law theorists for years in the area of impossibility and
criminal attempts. Indeed, the following was considered the law:
[Vol. 91604
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just as we cannot say that Julia intended to buy a shirt made
by child slave labor, and therefore, we cannot fault her for her
purchase, we also cannot say that the opaquely reckless actor who
chose to risk harm also chose to risk death. And "[t] o deny signifi-
cance to differing descriptions of the intention's object is to alter
radically our understanding of what intention is." 4
Indeed, it is not just that substitution fails to take into ac-
count how mental states work, but also that this failure is fun-
damentally unfair. We are holding someone responsible for a
harm that is incommensurate with her culpability. "One who in-
tends to inflict grievous bodily harm has a level of culpability
commensurate to that wrong, not a level commensurate to the
wrong actually done but not intended. Forfeiture rules betray a
Intent... must be distinguished from motive, desire and expectation. If Cby reason
of his hatred of A plans to kill him, but mistaking B for A shoots B. his motive, desire and
expectation are to kill A but his intent is to kill B. If a married man forcibly has intercourse
with a woman whom he believes to be his wife's twin sister, but who in fact is his wife, he is
not guilty of rape because his intent was to have intercourse with the woman he attacked,
who is his wife. If A takes an umbrella which he believes to belong to B. but which is in fact
his own, he does not have the intent to steal, his intent being to take the umbrella he
grasps in his hand, which is his own umbrella....
Edwin R Keedy, Criminal Attempts at Common Law, 102 U. PA. L REV. 464, 466-67 (1954)
(footnotes omitted). Keedy fails to recognize that intentions, just like motives, desires,
and expectations, have intentional objects and that intentional objects may not be substi-
tuted. Thus, when A intends to steal B' umbrella but the umbrella is really his ow,, A
has the intention of stealing B r umbrella, and therefore, has attempted to do so. A is not
guilty of the completed crime of theft, as the umbrella actually is his own. &e MPC
§ 5.01(1) (a) (defendant commits an attempt when he purposefully engages in conduct
which would be a crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believed them to be).
See also Graham Hughes, One Funrher Footnote on Attempting the Impoasbe, 42 N.Y.U. L
REv. 1005, 1009 (1967) in which Hughes criticizes People v. Jaffe, 78 N.E. 169 (1906),
which plays fast and loose with the concept of intention, where a defendant received
property he believed to be stolen, but which in fact was not. TheJaffe court reasons, "the
act, which it was doubtless the intent of the defendant to commit would not have been a
crime if it had been consummated." 78 N.E. at 500. Hughes correctly notes that this
statement "is very questionable and turns upon a choice of what is relevant in establish-
ing what intention is. It clearly seems no defiance of ordinary language to say thatJaffe
intended to receive stolen goods, for, in speaking of a person's intention, we frequently
incorporate his mistaken view of the situation, since belief and intent cannot be neatly
separated." Hughes, at 1009.
23 Michael S. Moore, Fowrseeing Harm Opaqudy, rprinted in Action AND VALUE N
CaRmIALLAw 125, 137 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993) (arguing against the foreseeabil-
ity test for proximate causation because there is no principled or rationally defensible
way to privilege one description of the harm that occurs over another and thus the fore-
seeability test is vacuous).
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'throw away the key' mentality that cannot be justified.0' Here,
where we are struggling to determine how culpable the
opaquely reckless actor is and what to hold her accountable for,
to simply say that by engaging in dangerous conduct she is liable
for all results that follow, would be to abandon our problem,
not to resolve it.
2 2
B. TIME FRAMING
Another approach to the opaque recklessness problem
would be to insist that this is just a matter of time framing. If we
grant that the opaquely reckless actor did not consciously disre-
gard a substantial and unjustifiable risk at the time he chose to
run through the red light, can we find that his failure to analyze
the harm is itself culpable? In other words, can we turn this co-
nundrum simply into a question of time framing and look back to
see if the actor made a prior culpable choice not to analyze the
risk of harm that he was presenting?
3
This approach would be similar to that taken by the court in
People v. Decina, where the defendant was an epileptic who, while
driving a car, had a seizure and hit four pedestrians." The defen-
dant contended that because of the seizure he did not have con-
trol over his body and therefore he had not performed a
voluntary act when he hit the pedestrians25 The court concluded,
however, that by going back in time, it could find a voluntary act
21 Michael S. Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability, 76 B.U. L. REv. 319, 329 (1996); see
also Kadish, supra note 10, at 376 ("Like these related doctrines, the common purpose
doctrine is essentially arbitrary in serving to convict persons of crimes for which they lack
the stipulated degree of culpability; the fact that the defendant has the culpability for
some crime does not itself establish his culpability for another more serious crime.").
For examples of where courts have correctly refused to employ forfeiture rules, see
Regina v. Pembliton, 2 Cox Grim. Gas. 607 (1874) (finding, in a malicious damage to
property case, that where the defendant sought to hit another person with a stone, but
caused property damage instead, the intent to harm another person could not be substi-
tuted for the intent to damage property); Regina v. Faulkner, 13 Cox Grim. Gas. 550
(1877) (defendant accused of arson where he intended to steal from ship, but acciden-
tally set the ship on fire; intent to steal was not substituted for intent to set fire to the
ship).
23 Steven Sverdlik dubs this the "Aristotelian Strategy." Steven Sverdlik, Pure Negligence,
30 AMER. PHnL Q. 137, 140 (1993) ("[Flor the Aristotelian blame for a norm violation
always entails that the agent either intended to do wrong, or chose to take the risk of do-
ing wrong, at the time of wrongdoing, or at some earlier time. In brief: blame requires
choice.").
24 138 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1956).
21 Id. at 803.
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and the requisite mens rea: Decina knew he had epilepsy and still
decided to drive the car.2
Can we approach opaque recklessness as the court did in De-
dna? Can we go back in time and find a prior culpable choice by
the opaquely reckless actor not to think about the risk that he was
presenting? Maybe. Perhaps in some cases we can find such a
culpable choice, but this may not always be true. Moreover,
chances are that that choice was at least as opaque as the one be-
fore it. To illustrate, we shall return to your incident with the pe-
destrian and the thought processes of a typical red-light runner:
If the red-light runner foresees the risk of killing a pedestrian,
he is purely reckless. Indeed, if at any point, a passenger in the
car screams, "Stop! You might kill a pedestrian!", then once the
red-light runner decides to proceed, he is being purely reckless.
On the other hand, it simply is not possible for the red-light
runner to foresee "harm" and think, "well, I cannot think any-
more about the harm that I am presenting or I will have actually
consciously disregarded it" without having thus thought more
about the harm. As soon as the red-light runner recognizes the
risk, he cannot backtrack-how can the red-light runner con-
sciously choose not to be conscious of the risk?2
' Id.; cf Mark Kelman, Intepretive Constuction in the Crininal Law, 33 S AN. L REV.
591, 603-605 (1981) (arguing that the act requirement is vacuous because it can be ma-
nipulated to any given result, depending upon how narrowly or how broadly one defines
the time period). But see MICHAEL MOORE, Acr AND CRnn TBE PHMOSOPHY OF ACnO.N
AND ITS INM'LcATIONS FOR CIUmAL LAW 35-36 (1993) ('here is no 'time-framing' choice
here. If there is any point in time where the act and inens ea requirements are simulta-
neously satisfied, and from which the requisite causal relations exist to some legally pro-
hibited state of af-airs, then the defendant is prima facie liable.").
Cf Michael Zimmerman, Negligence and Moral Responsibility, 20 Nous 199, 199-211
(1986) [hereinafter Zimmerman, Negligence] (arguing that an actor who behaves neg-
ligently may be held morally responsible for that negligence if at a prior time, the ac-
tor adverted to the possibility of causing harm by his actions and failed to take
precautionary measures to prevent such foreseen harm); see also Michael J. Zimmer-
man, Moral Responsibility and Ignorance, 107 EThCS 410, 420-21 (1997) [hereinafter Zim-
merman, Moral Responsibility] (presenting the case of Perry who pulls Doris from a car
accident only to paralyze her;, contemplating whether Perry would be culpable had he
previously signed up for, but decided to skip, a first aid course; and noting that whether
Perry is thus accountable for paralyzing Doris depends on his contemplation of such a
risk at the time he decided to skip the class).
This is, of course, assuming that the red-light runner lacksjustification and/or the
risk is substantial.
"Imagine the parent who hears a loud crash coming from her child's room and
hollers, "I don't even want to know what is going on in therel" Isn't that exactly what
the parent is doing, thinking about what is going on in there?
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Further, even if the red-light runner could choose not to ana-
lyze further the harm that he is presenting, his notion of the harm
that he is posing by not analyzing the harm in running through
the red-light may be just as opaque: he may not recognize the
harm in not analyzing the harm ... in not analyzing the harm...
in not analyzing the harm that he is presenting by running
through the red light. Hence, he may never consciously disregard
the risk that he might kill a pedestrian. 0
By the same analysis, analogizing opaque recklessness to
willful blindness will not work either. The common law's ap-
proach has been that an actor who purposefully chooses not to
"know" that a material element exists so as to avoid the mens rea
of knowledge required by a statute, has, by legal fiction, been
deemed to have the requisite knowledge. That is, because the
defendant has not behaved like an ethically well-disposed actor,
" See also Larry Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship Among Voluntay Acts, Strict Li-
ability, and Negligence in Criminal Law, 7 Soc. PHin. & POL'Y 84, 102 (1990) (arguing that
finding a prior culpable choice may present problems: the choice may be remote in the
causal chain and the culpability in making the prior culpable choice may not correspond
to the requisite degree of culpability for the harm that actually occurs).
Indeed, Zimmerman reaches just this conclusion when he discusses whether moral
responsibility for negligence may be grounded in a prior culpable choice not to safe-
guard against foreseen future harms. He imagines Bert, the bricklayer, who tosses de-
fective bricks over his shoulder-a long-formed habit. Bert typically works under
conditions where such a habit is safe, but unfortunately, he fills in for a sick worker
and unthinkingly tosses a brick off a new high rise, killing a pedestrian below. Even
after concluding that Bert may be morally accountable if he adverted to the possibility
of injuring someone at the time he formed the habit, Zimmerman must confront the
problem that the harm disregarded was not the harm that materialized:
[W]hile Bert foresaw the possibility that he would injure someone if he continued to
indulge unthinkingly in his habit of tossing defective bricks over his shoulder, it may not
have occurred to him that he would killsomeone, and presumably it did not occur to him
the particular person (call him Pete) that he did kill-someone (we may assume) with
whom he was not acquainted. My account then commits me to saying that Bert is not mor-
ally responsible for killing Pete.
Zimmerman, Negligence, supra note 27, at 211.
Thus, looking at Zimmerman's analysis, if Bert makes a prior culpable choice to
risk "injury" but the result is death, Bert may only be fairly held accountable for the
extent of harm that he foresaw (injury) but not for the actual harm (death). Bert
may have been opaquely reckless if he broadly foresaw "injury" without any specifics,
(e.g., death, grievous bodily injury, or minor injury). That Bert did not foresee injury-
ing Pete is of little consequence as the law forbids negligence/recklessness vis-a-vis a
person and Bert did foresee injury to a person. See DRESsLER, supra note 16, at 109 (ar-
guing that we do not need the transferred intent doctrine because when D intends to
kill A but kills V instead, D nevertheless intended to kill a human beingwhich is what
the statute prohibits).
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but rather has tried to circumvent the law, this circumvention
will itself be sufficient for responsibility31
Under such an approach, one might question whether the
opaquely reckless actor is trying to avoid being reckless by not
thinking through the risk presented. Yet, as seen above,
(1) query whether such mental gymnastics are even possible and
(2) even if one could will oneself not to think through the risk
presented, this endeavor may include just as opaque a choice.
In contrast, the willfully blind actor knows exactly what he is
purposefully avoiding knowledge of.
Note, however, that despite the potential for disparate cul-
pabilities between the harm foreseen and the harm that results,
the Model Penal Code does adopt this approach in one area, that
32 Cdof voluntary intoxication. The Code states that "[w]hen reck-
lessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to
self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would
have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immate-
rial."33 The drafters of the Model Penal Code, in determining
whether voluntary intoxication could negate the mental state of
recklessness, rejected a case-by-case analysis of whether the defen-
dant foresaw the specific danger at the time he got drunk in favor
of a blanket rule that when an actor voluntarily consumes alcohol
he is presumed to be reckless as to any harm that occurs because
everyone knows the risks inherent in excessive drinking., But, as
noted by David Treiman, "[tlhough the person who voluntarily
becomes intoxicated may consciously disregard the risk of some
nonspecific harm, to hold such a person liable for recklessness
when he was only negligent greatly expands liability.' 05 While the
drafters of the Model Penal Code were willing to equate the po-
tentially disproportionate culpabilities of an actor's choice to get
drunk with recklessness regarding the harm that materializes,
their drafting choice was based upon the leap of faith that actors
are sufficiently culpable for reckless crimes when actors choose to
"' See, eg., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1976) ("[,Willful blind-
ness] differs from positive knowledge only so far as necessary to encompass a calculated
effort to avoid sanctions of the statute while violating its substance."); cf MPC § 2.02(7)
(equating knowledge (practical certainty) with awareness of a high probability, thus ig-
noring the culpability aspect focused on by the common law).
-1 MPG § 2.08(2).
"Id.
'4 SeeMPC § 2.08 cmt. 1.
Treiman, supra note 4, at 261.
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get drunk.-6 While such a forfeiture rule is troubling in the volun-
tary intoxication context," it is beyond the pale to apply such a
rule in other areas.
We have determined that we can use neither substitution
nor time framing. Substitution fails to solve the opaque reck-
lessness problem because rather than casting light on the men-
tal state of opaque recklessness, it grossly misconstrues how
mental states work. Moreover, following this approach will not
result in us determining how culpable opaque recklessness is,
but rather, in our abandoning the culpability question at its in-
ception. Time framing likewise fails to solve our problem for
two reasons. First, we may reasonably doubt that one can will
oneself not to be conscious of a risk. Second, even if such an act
of will is possible, the choice to be opaquely reckless may be an
equally opaque choice.
Accord Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Criminal Negligence, 1 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 431,
435-36 (1998):
As a matter of drafting history, the Code's treatment of voluntary intoxication in crimes of
recklessness seems to have been a compromise which was papered over with the thinnest of
rationales.... The compromise was rationalized with the proposition that reckless conduct
should not be negated by voluntary intoxication, because becoming intoxicated voluntarily is
itself reckless behavior. As a moment's reflection will reveal, this equivalence is sometimes
present, sometimes not. The fact is that the Code's treatment of voluntary intoxication in
cases of recklessness cannot be squared with the Code's general culpability provision, which
conceives of culpability as a conscious mental state regarding the harm done.
Notably, Huigens does not dispute the MPG's position on voluntary intoxication,
finding it consistent with virtue ethics, the rationale for punishment that he endorses.
" Accord Larry Alexander, The Supreme Court, Dr. Jeckyll, and the Due Process of Proof,
1996 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 214 (1996):
The Model Penal Code approach to intoxication can be viewed as one in which voluntary
intoxication is treated like a culpable but nonpunishable act that enters the actor in a pun-
ishment lottery. If he is lucky and does not commit the actus reus of some crime, nothing
happens. If, however, he is unlucky and commits the actus reus of some crime, he is pun-
ished for whatever crime he happens to commit at the level he would have been punished
had he committed the crime recklessly, including reckless homicide.
Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of
Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1985):
[T]he imputation of recklessness is objectionable because even if the actor was reckless, or
even purposeful, as to getting intoxicated, it does not follow that he is reckless as to causing
the death of the pedestrian. The notion that a person risks all manner of resulting harm
when he voluntarily becomes intoxicated is common, but obviously incorrect.
(footnotes omitted). Some courts have likewise been critical of the assimilation. See,
e.g., People v. Whitfield, 868 P.2d 272, 280 (Cal. 1994) (constructing a hypothetical
situation in which the defendant would not foresee his dangerous future conduct
when he chose to become intoxicated).
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II. OTHER MENTAL STATE THEORmS?
We have already established that opaque recklessness cannot
be collapsed into the criminal law's current framework. We can-
not avoid this problem as we cannot substitute the vague sense of
harm foreseen for the actual harm that materializes nor can we go
back in time to an earlier culpable choice not to analyze the risk
presented.
Now, we should take a look at practical, or culpable, indiffer-
ence, a mental state proposed by RA. Duff and Kenneth Simons
independently. After presenting Duff's theory of practical indif-
ference, an "attitude in action" that he contends should suffice
for recklessness, I discuss why Duff's shaky metaphysical assump-
tions provide insufficient grounding for opaque recklessness.
Moreover, I contend that even if one were inclined to accept
Duff's metaphysics, his theory is plagued with ambiguity. After
Duff, I turn to Simons' theory of culpable indifference, where I
conclude that Simons' theory is likewise unable to resolve the
opaque recklessness problem. Simons' theory, endorsing pun-
ishment for desire-states, punishes an actor based upon his
character, not because of the actor's choices over which he has
any control, and thus does not present a viable means for resolv-
ing the issue of opaque recklessness.
A. DUFF'S PRACTICAL INDIFFERENCE
1. Duffs Theory
Duff believes that recklessness should encompass "practical
indifference," an attitude encompassed in action that reflects that
the actor cares too little about the risk that he is creating s3 Pre-
liminarily, Duff sets forth his view of mental states, rejecting what
he takes to be the "dualist" view that "portrays mens te as an oc-
current mental state accompanying the actus reus."o Duff cri-
I am intentionally avoiding any attempt to collapse opaque recklessness into the
concept of gross negligence. "Gross negligence" means, in different contexts, either
1) pure recklessness or 2) negligence with a sharp departure from the ordinary stan-
dard of care (eg., really negligent conduct). Neither definition is of any use here,
and any attempt to include opaque recklessness within the rubric of "gross negli-
gence" would lead to even greater confusion in an already fuzzy concept.
s' R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY, AND CnMMIZL LTBx . PHILOSOPHY OF ACrON AND
TffCRnmENL LAw 162-63 (1990).
4 Id at 158-59. According to Duff,
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tiques not just the metaphysical dualism of Descartes' time, but
also contemporary epistemological dualists.4  He objects to
metaphysical dualism, not on the classic objection-that it can-
not explain the interaction of mind and body4 --but rather on
its reliance on the argument from analogy.4' That is, Duff argues
that since each individual only has his own experience-"when I
say ouch, it is because I am in pain"-there is insufficient data
for us to generalize to others that when they say "ouch," they are
in pain. Duff uses the example of a fight between him and a
redheaded man, arguing that one experience with this man
does not allow him to generalize that all redheaded men are
violent.44 Indeed, Duff argues that even many fights with this
one man, as we have many experiences with our own minds, is
[a]n agent's awareness of a risk involves, on this view, the occurrence in his mind of
the thought of that risk (a thought like "this might kill someone") at the relevant
time: but this is not what awareness or knowledge involves ....
The occurrence of some thought such as "this might kill someone" is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition of realizing that I am creating a risk of death. It
is not sufficient, since it could be just an idle thought, not one that manifests knowl-
edge or awareness. It is not necessary, since my awareness of the likely effects of my
actions is a matter, not of what happens in the hidden reaches of my mind, but of
the manifest pattern of my actions and reactions.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 116-35.
42 The most famous rejection of dualism is Ryle's. GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF
MIND (1949). The classic attack on dualism is humorously played out by Daniel Den-
nett:
The standard objection to dualism was all too familiar to Descartes himself in the
seventeenth century, and it is fair to say that neither he nor any subsequent dualist has ever
overcome it convincingly. If mind and body are distinct things or substances, they never-
theless must interact: the bodily sense organs, via the brain, must inform the mind.
This confrontation between quite standard physics and dualism has been endlessly
discussed since Descartes' own day, and is widely recognized as the inescapable and fatal
flaw of dualism.
Dualism's embarrassment here is really simpler than the citation of presumed laws of
physics suggests. It is the same incoherence that children notice - but tolerate happily in
fantasy - in such fare as Casper the Friendly Ghost. How can Casper both glide through
walls and grab a falling towel? How can mind stuff both elude all physical measurement
and control the body?
DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAiNED 34-36 (1991).
4 3
DUFF, supra note 39, at 120-23.
'Id. at 120-21.
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insufficient information with which to generalize.4 Moreover,
he claims that we cannot simply rely on what someone tells us
because that is simply the behavior of uttering noises by a thing
we take to be a human.46 The inability to generalize from one-
self to others is the objection that Duff believes is fatal not only
to metaphysical dualists, but also to materialists whom he dubs
"epistemological dualists." He reasons that even if we tried to
correlate brain states to mental states, we would still need to rely
on others telling us that they have a particular mental state to
match it to the brain state.
47
With this objection to dualism in place, Duff argues that in-
tention is a part of action. We do not simply look at someone's
bodily movements-we look at his "actions." Action, in Duff's
view, is not just a colorless bodily movement,' s but rather a bod-
ily movement with meaning. Intentions, he argues, are then a
part of actions.50  Forward-looking intentions, moreover, are
simply about committing oneself to action.5' To Duff, intentions
do not exist independently of an action to which they are
bound. '52 Thus, Duff rejects the view that mens rea must involve a
running monologue in the actor's mind, constantly stating to the
actor what he is doing, and argues instead that we should look at
the "attitude" of the actor's actions.5
In arguing that we should look at the attitude that the actor's
action displays, Duff is quick to clarify that he does not mean that
we should look at the actor's feelings about his action anymore
than we should look at the actor's thoughts about his action 4
'Id. at 121.
IS If someone speaks to me I directly observe only certain movements and sounds. To
know that a person is telling me something (that these are not just meaningless sounds
emanating from a mindless body), I must know that this is a person who intends to com-
municate to me-that these sounds are caused by a particular mental state; and I can know
this only by making an analogical reference from the sounds which I hear emerging from
this body to the existence and the intentions of a mind which cause them-to their status
as meaning and speech.
Id. at 122.
47 Id. at 121-22.
" This view of action differentiates Duff from both materialists and behaviorists.
Id. at 130-31.
Id. at 130 ("the intention is identical with, not something separate from, his ob-
servable action").
", Id. at 133-34 ("a bare intention is a bond by which I tie myself to further action").
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Rather, Duff contends that we can glean the actor's attitude from
the character of the action: "an agent's indifference to a risk
which she creates is a matter not of her occurrent feelings, but of
the meaning of her actions. . .."5 And the meaning of an actor's
action can be practical indifference.
Turning to the theory of practical indifference, Duff gives
two examples to show that indifference can be part of action and
need not involve a separate mental state. The first is the defen-
dant who engages in conduct with the intent to cause grievous
bodily harm, e.g., a defendant who intends to maliciously wound
another.56 Duff claims that the defendant must notice the risk of
death, and if he does not notice it, then he is certainly indifferent
to it.57 Duffs second example is that of the bridegroom who is at
the local tavern with his friends when he should be at the
church. 8 Duff argues that the bridegroom's absence from the
church is practically indifferent.59 These examples, Duff believes,
"show[] how I can be indifferent to what I do not notice. What
I notice or attend to reflects what I care about; and my very fail-
ure to notice something can display my utter indifference to
it."6 Thus, "we can explain criminal recklessness in terms of
practical indifference which the agent's actions display; and we
can also see that such practical indifference can be displayed
both in conscious risk-taking, and in [one's] very failure to no-
tice a risk."6'
0 Id.






"I Id. One can, however, endorse indifference as the correct definition of reckless-
ness, yet reject Duff's conception of it. Alan White, for example, argues that indifference
necessarily involves awareness of the risk.
Recklessness or indifference, like fearlessness, tactlessness, boredom, or confidence,
is a state of mind which denotes a positive lack of its opposite, whether this opposite be re-
gard, care, fear, tact, interest, or doubt. Because this lack can vary from the slightest to the
fullest, such states of mind can be characterized by degrees from 'quite', 'pretty', 'some-
what' to 'completely', 'absolutely' or 'perfectly'. But what these states lack to various de-
grees is something which themselves all imply awareness. Thus, one cannot regard, care
for, fear, be tactful of, interest in, or doubt, that whose presence one is ignorant. Hence,
one cannot be said to lack, in small measure or completely and absolutely, a regard, care
or tact for, a fear or doubt of, an interest in, that of which one is unaware. One cannot be
perfectly, any more than one can be partly, indifferent to a lady's charms, absolutely or
partly unafraid of thunder, bored by science fiction, or confident of one's choice, unless
one knows of these.
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2. Theoretical Challenges to Duffs vzew
Under Duff's view, the opaquely reckless actor who engages
in dangerous action exhibits her indifference to the welfare of
others and is therefore reckless. Thus, if one accepts the theory
of practical indifference then the opaque recklessness problem
is solved. But can/should we accept Duff's theory?
What is most troubling about Duff's account is his complete
abandonment of the "dualist" view in favor of the concept of at-
titudes that accompany action.63 We certainly have beliefs, de-
sires, and intentions. Indeed, Michael Bratman, in a
groundbreaking book, has set forth a comprehensive theory of
our use of intentions and how we employ them in reasoning
and planning.Y Duff, on the other hand, presents an odd view
ALANR. WHrlm, MIS-FADING CASES 39 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
62 A couple of points should be noted about Duffs hypotheticals before addressing
the indifference standard head-on. First, the grievous bodily harm example pulls at our
intuitions for one reason: we doubt that the actor can honestly intend to cause griev-
ously bodily harm without being aware of the risk of death.
Duffs second hypothetical likewise pulls at our intuitions because we do not believe
that the bridegroom simply forgot his wedding. In fact, how could he be out drinking
with his friends? Didn't he write down the date? Don't his friends know about the wed-
ding? How did he wind up at the tavern? And if he chose not to write down the date,
chose not to tell his friends, or chose to go to the bar before his wedding began, aren't
we seeing a culpable choice somewhere in the mix? See di on supra section I.B., re-
garding time framing; see also Michael S. Moore, Responsiility and the Unconsiaou, 53 S.
CAl.. L REV. 1563, 1630 (1980) (arguing that one possible reason a woman might hold
her lover "responsible" for standing her up is because the lover performed earlier actions
rendering it less likely that he would keep the appointment).
Now, the bride will certainly hold her groom accountable for his absence. But is that
accountability based on the prerequisites to criminal liability? Of course not. Rather, in
life, we properly fault people for their character defects. Indeed, we would dislike this
groom even if he had shown up at the church, if we knew, for example, that he did not
truly love the bride and was only marrying her for her money. Many people may not be
as virtuous as we would like but that does notjustify our punishing them.
63 Michael Corrado rejects Duffs attack of dualism, arguing that Duffs discussion
is "rife with confusion" and "irrelevant to the law." Michael Corrado, How to Do
Things on Purpose: RA. Duffs Intention, Agency, and Criminal Liability. 11 LAW & PHIL.
265, 276 & n.27 (1992). As Duffs view of "attitude in action" is central to Duff's
claims about practical indifference, an aspect of Duffs book that Corrado does not
address, I will further explore Duffs alternative metaphysical view.
64 MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTIONS, PLANS, AND PRACmiC.AL REASOx (reprinted
1999).
As Bratman explains:
I think we gain more insight into the kinds of agents we are by putting aside such at-
tempts at reduction [of intentions into a belief-desire model] and taking seriously the idea
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that intentions do not exist independently of actions, but rather
are inextricably linked to actions. According to Duff, my inten-
tion today to send my children to public schools (I have no
children currently) binds me to the future action of sending
them to public schools. Bratman presents the more sophisti-
cated view that my current intention helps me to navigate my
life from now until the time I have school-age children, but rec-
ognizes that under the circumstances, many things may happen
between now and then that may cause me to reconsider my in-
tention. According to Bratman, intentions are mental states
that co-exist and work with beliefs and desires.r
But Duff's odd view of forward-looking intentions as tied to
actions is just the tip of the iceberg. In his attempt to tie cur-
rent intentions to actions, he fails to distinguish between basic
and complex actions. Take two different meanings of "acciden-
tally."6 First, X kills a donkey accidentally, meaning his bodily
movement caused the donkey to be killed, as would happen if
X's finger slipped on the trigger. Note here the basic action
(pulling the trigger) was not intentional, nor was the causally
complex action (killing the donkey) intentional. Now assume X
shoots at a tree next to the donkey but accidentally hits the
donkey. Here, the basic action is intentional, but the causally
complex action is not. How is "intention" or "attitude" a part of
action? And to which "action" does Duff refer? Does the actor
reveal practical indifference in Example One where no inten-
tion exists? In Example Two where the only intention is the ba-
sic action but there is no intention to kill the donkey (the
causally complex action)? Is there an attitude in action only in
a third example where X shoots at the donkey to kill it?
Most importantly perhaps, one can accept Duff's attacks on
dualism without abandoning Intentionality. This is, in fact, the
move made by Daniel Dennett. Dennett recognizes the faults of
that intentions are distinctive states of mind, on par with desires and beliefs. Intentions are
conduct-controlling pro-attitudes, ones which we are disposed to retain without reconsid-
eration, and which play a significant role as inputs into reasoning to yet further intentions.
Id. at 20.
" See also John Gardner and Heike Jung, Making Sense of Mens Rea: Antony Duffs
Account, 11 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STuD. 559, 567 (1991) (asking why Duff thought it
worthwhile to raise the concept of bare intentions because they are unrelated to
Duff's mens rea questions and are "infinitely more difficult").
The donkey example is from J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 PROC.




dualism, 67 but alsojoins Duffs affront to materialism.' Dennett,
however, offers an alternative: consciousness. And it is con-
sciousness, according to Dennett, that can:
o be the medium in which the purple cow is rendered;
o be the thinking thing, the Iin "I think, therefore I am";
o appreciate wine, hate racism, love someone, be a source
of mattering, and
" act with moral responsibility.
Such an approach allows us to reject dualism yet embrace
what the folk psychology of the law has long accepted-that
people do have intentions, beliefs, and desires that exist apart
from action. Thus, to accept Duff's view is to be committed to
an odd set of metaphysics.70
3. The Ambiguity of Attitudes
But even if we could accept Duff's metaphysics, his theory is
still empty. How are we to know the meaning of another's ac-
6 See supra note 42.
6 Dennett tells the reader to imagine a purple cow, and then asks a series of ques-
tions about the imagined cow (whether it was facing left or right, whether it was chew-
ing cud, whether its udder was visible, and what shade of purple was imagined).
Dennett then discusses the relation of this imagined cow to the theory of materialism:
There are events in your brain that are tightly associated with your particular imagin-
ings, so it is not out of the question that in the near future a neuroscientist, examining the
processes that occurred in your brain in response to my instructions, would be able to de-
cipher them to the extent of being able to confirm or disconfirm your ansers to [my
questions]:
"Was the cow facing left? We think so. The cow-head neuronal excitation pattern
was consistent with upper4eft visual quadrant presentation, and we observed one-herz os-
cillatory motion-detection signals that suggest cud-cheing, but could detect no activity in
the udder-complex representation groups, and, after calibration of evoked potentials with
the subjectes color-detection profiles, we hypothesize that the subject is lying about the
color the imagined cow was almost certainly brown."
[Slince you did imagine a cow (you are not lying - the scientists even confirm that),
an imagined cow came into existence at that time; something, somewhere must have had
those properties at that time. The imagined cow must be rendered not in the medium of
brain stuff, but in the medium of... mind stuff. What else could it be?
Id. at 26.
6" Id. at 34.
' Accord Gardner andJung, supra note 65, at 586 ("[In Duffs book,] [tlhere is the
substantial critical discussion of 'dualist' and 'behaviorist' philosophies of mind-
which seem, on Duff's account, to include between them most of the philosophies of
mind which have ever been seriously entertained, and leave Duff with an all but unin-
telligible position of his own.").
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tions? To what extent is there an attitude of indifference encap-
sulated in an action? What is the relationship between the role
of desires and beliefs and Duff's conception of an "attitude"
within action? Consider my purchase of an ice cream cone. I de-
sire food. I believe that an ice cream cone will satisfy my desire. I
also believe that I like ice cream. Fighting my desire for food is
my desire to lose weight. Nevertheless, the hunger wins and I re-
solve my competing desires with the intention that I go buy an ice
cream cone.
Now, looking at my buying of the ice cream cone through
Duff s eyes, what do we have? What attitude is revealed by my
purchase? My desire for food? My love of ice cream? My desire
to gain weight or my indifference thereto? Certainly, there are a
myriad of beliefs and desires that one might attribute to my pur-
chase, but my purchase, in and of itself, does not imply one atti-
tude over another. In fact, some attitudes that might be
attributed to my purchase, e.g., I must desire to gain weight if I am
opting for the hot fudge sundae, might be false (a competing de-
sire won the mental battle or akrasia stepped in). Indeed, one
cannot even infer that I am indifferent to gaining weight-per-
haps I have made a deal with myself to skip dinner in exchange
for this treat.
Thus, practical indifference cannot solve the opaque reck-
lessness problem. The theory, as Duff presents it, rests on shaky
metaphysics. Moreover, there is no way to choose what "attitude"
an action reveals. 7' Rather, the meaning of the action is derived
from the beliefs, desires, and intentions that accompany it. For
someone who believes in the independent significance of desire-
states, we turn to Kenneth Simons.
7' For further illustration, consider Duffs hypotheticals. As to the malicious wounder,
she may in fact be indifferent to whether her victim dies. But take Stephen King's novel,
Misery, where an author's "biggest fan" holds him hostage and eventually maliciously
wounds him to keep him under her control. STEPHEN KING, MISERY (1990). It is not the
case that this fan is indifferent to the author's death. Rather, she very much wants him to
live.
Or take a look at the bridegroom. True, few people would want to be his bride. But
think about Robin Williams' absent-minded professor character in the movie Flubber.
FLUBBER (Disney 1997). Williams is so absent-minded that he has missed his wedding
several times. He programs his robot to remind him of his wedding day, but alas, the ro-
bot "girl" is in love with Williams and intentionally fails to inform Williams of the date.
So, when Williams, rather than being at the church, is at his lab creating "Flubber," it is
not because he does not love his fianc6, or because his work means more to him than she
does, it is simply because he forgot.
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B. SIMONS' CULPABLE INDIFFERENCE
1. Simons'Proposed Mental State Hierarchy
Simons does not believe that culpable indifference is an "atti-
tude" derived from action, nor does he argue that culpable indif-
ference should be included within the definition of recklessness.
Rather, Simons contends that the conventional hierarchy of pur-
pose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence, as adopted by the
Model Penal Code, is "seriously inadequate."'" Simons argues that
the problem with the Model Penal Code's approach to mens rea is
that it only acknowledges cognitive-based mental states and ig-
nores conative-based (desire-based) mental states.?
Simons advances "culpable indifference," a mental state
within the conative hierarchy, as the appropriate standard for
threshold criminal liability. "An actor who is culpably indifferent
to a harmful result neither desires the result nor desires to avoid
it. Rather, she cares much less than she should about bringing it
about." 74 In proposing culpable indifference, Simons imagines an
actor very similar to my red-light runner: "Betty while running a
red light, does not notice a pedestrian about to cross the street.
She . . . strikes and injures [the] pedestrian."" Simons reasons
that, "Betty is culpably indifferent because her action of running a
red light displays an attitude of indifference to the safety of oth-
ers."76 Thus, to Simons, the gap filler between pure recklessness
and negligence lies in the complete disrespect for human life that
the defendant exhibits.
Simons additionally contends that conative and cognitive lev-
els of culpability cannot be ranked-that is, one can be more or
less culpable on either scale but the scales cannot be combined.77
Thus, Simons would not present "culpable indifference," a cona-
tive-based culpable mental state, to solve my opaque recklessness
conundrum. I think that it is fair to say, however, that Simons
would contend that in cases where the defendant has only an
' Kenneth IV. Simons, Culpability and Reributive 77wlor: The Problem of Cnmmal Negh-
genr 1994J. CoNmeP. LEGAL ISSUEs 365, 371.
' Id. Simons also argues for a third hierarchy based on conduct in addition to the
cognitive and conative hierarchies he proposes. Id at 377.7
4 Id.
7I& at 365.
76 Id. at 378.
77Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking ntal State, 72 B.U. L RM 463, 478 (1992).
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amorphous concept of the risk, but taking the risk displays an in-
difference to human life, the defendant is culpably indifferent but
not cognitively reckless. 8 Thus, Simons would employ culpable
indifference to solve my puzzle.
2. Why Culpable Indifference Fails
But I cannot rely on culpable indifference. First, I disagree
with Simons' contention that the conventional hierarchy is fun-
damentally flawed. While he argues that purpose is a conative
mental state, and knowledge and recklessness are cognitive men-
tal states, I do not see any reason to split the baby this way.79 Our
criminal system is about prohibiting actors from causing certain
harms.0 With regard to any prohibited harm, when one is acting,
there is really only one of two general categories of mental states
that one can have toward that harm: the harm can be the actor's
goal, e.g., his purpose in so acting, or the harm can be a side-effect
of the actor's actions. When the harm is a side-effect, the actor
can believe that it is practically certain to materialize (knowledge)
"' Indeed, it appears that, for Simons, part of the draw of culpable indifference is
that he finds cognitive recklessness to present the very problem discussed here:
In order to be consciously reckless, must he believe that the risk is nontrivial? Sub-
stantial? In absolute terms, or relative to the potential justifications for his conduct? Must
he be consciously aware, while he is driving, that a pedestrian is in the vicinity? Is it
enough that he apprehend the general risks of running a red light-including the risk that
that action might endanger pedestrians? Even if that suffices, must his general apprehen-
sion be conscious? Must it coincide with his action of running the red light? Even if he
need only apprehend the general risks, is it enough that he understands the risks of unsafe
driving to other persons, or must he more specifically understand that those risks include
risks to possible pedestrians?
Simons, supra note 72, at 382; see also id. at 384 (elaborating further on the problems
with recklessness that are discussed herein).
71 Cf Alexander, supra note 4, at 937 (arguing Simons is incorrect because recklessness
as currently formulated encompasses belief and desire elements). In Insufficient Concern,
Alexander contends that purpose and knowledge can be collapsed into recklessness. He
argues that there is only a "single moral injunction":
[C]hoose only those acts for which the risk to others' interests - as you estimate
those risks-are sufficiently low to be outweighed by the interests, to yourself and others,
that you are attempting to advance (discounted by the probability of advancing those in-
terests).
Id. at 939. Opaque recklessness is as problematic for Alexander's conception of reckless-
ness as it is for the Model Penal Code's definition. If the actor is not thinking through
the risk he is presenting, he is not balancing his interests against the risk to others.
" This is a somewhat simplistic statement of our criminal justice system, lacking an
explanation of culpability and wrongdoing. Nevertheless, I believe that the simplicity of
the explanation above does not undermine my analysis of the workings of mental states.
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or that it poses a risk of materializing (recklessness) ..' Thus,
Simons' argument for a conative hierarchy cannot be based on
the actor's choice to cause or to risk harm. Simons instead
wants to punish those actors who just do not care enough.ss
" A few further points: Sometimes, an actor may purposefully create a risk of harm,
thus being reckless. In such a case, a harm that materializes is not a side-effect, but
rather is the result of an intentional endangerment. Additionally, of course, an actor
could be completely unaware of the harm, in which case the actor would be negligent if
his lack of awareness was unreasonable.
Simons views willful blindness as a form of culpable indifference, arguing that the
willfully blind satisfy a counterfactual inquiry- we are punishing them because these ac-
tors would have acted the same had they known of the existence of the material element.
Simons, supra note 72, at 381-82. Recently, Alan Michaels has adopted a similar view, ad-
vocating the new (or missing) mental state of acceptance to fill the gap between knowl-
edge and recklessness in cases of depraved heart murder and willful blindness. See
generally Michaels, supra note 10. Michaels notes problems with both the Model Penal
Code's conception of willfiil blindness as knowledge of a high probability (without a be-
lief to the contrary) and the common law's purposeful avoidance doctrine. Id. at 976-96.
Instead, he endorses a counterfactual question of whether a reckless defendant would
have continued in the face of certain harm. Id. at 961. I discuss my objections to any
form of counterfactual inquiry infia notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
While Michaels notes theoretical and practical problems with the common law's test,
its focus on the culpability of the actor for choosing not to know, is, I believe, the appro-
priate view of willful blindness. It is the criminal law's way to prevent an actor from avoid-
ing liability by capitalizing upon the difference between knowledge and recklessness.
The only difference between knowledge and recklessness is the degree of certainty that
the agent has. Sometimes, an actor views it as in his best interest not to confirm his sus-
picions-to remain uncertain-so as to be able to claim that he did not "know" some-
thing. Willful blindness prevents an actor from doing so. It allows us to punish him as if
he were practically certain where he makes the choice not to be.
For further discussion of willful blindness, see id.; Robin Charlow, lillful Ignoranae and
Criminal Cudpabi!ity, 70 T)hx L REV. 1351 (1992); David Luban, Contried Ignorane 87
GEO. LJ. 957 (1999).
I am not opposed to the term "indifference" to the extent that it embodies a
conscious decision to disregard the interests of others. Whether we employ the term,
reckesmeas, indfference, or Larry Alexander's insuffkcient concern, all three seem to en-
compass the disrespect for others that makes reckless conduct culpable. To me, cul-
pable indifference is exhibited by the choice to engage in reckless conduct, the
willingness to risk the bad side-effect of one's action. It is the outcome of the actor's
practical reasoning that is problematic. Moreover, to the extent that a conscious
choice is involved, all recklessness is indifference to me, and some reckless choices,
because of the degree of their unjustifiability, exhibit extreme indifference. I under-
stand Simons' position to be different as indifference to him is merely a desire-state. I
also take his complaint with indifference to involve the amount of weight that others'
interests are or are not given in the actor's practical reasoning. I am opposed to
Simons' conception of indifference insofar as it allows for punishment in the absence
of conscious choice, as I discuss in the text, but I am likewise unconvinced that he is
placing responsibility on the correct aspect of the actor's practical reasoning, as I dis-
cuss infra note 96.
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Second, and perhaps most troubling about culpable indiffer-
ence, is that it snares merely negligent actors in its net.84 Indeed,
unlike the red-light runner I hypothesize, Simons' Betty does not
necessarily advert to any risk of harm: she merely adverts to run-
ning the red light. Simons believes actors who are negligent but
nevertheless would have engaged in conduct had they adverted to
the risks involved are culpably indifferent.85 However, these actors
have merely failed to advert to the risks. They have not chosen to
create such risks.86
And we should not punish someone based on the prediction
that he would have chosen to do wrong had he been presented
with the choice. Any counterfactual inquiry fails for two rea-
sons. 7  First, it is indeterminate. Indeed, imagine Jane who is
8' Simons, supra note 72, at 377 ("(Culpable indifference] is often described as a
form of recklessness (though it could also be characterized as a form of negli-
gence)."). The force of this argument presupposes that the Model Penal Code is cor-
rect in distinguishing between recklessness and negligence with regard to the
threshold for criminal responsibility. I am deeply troubled by responsibility for negli-
gence, as negligence does not involve a culpable choice.
as Id. at 380-81; see also Alexander, supra note 4, at 937-38 (also reading Simons as
seeming to be willing to punish the negligent). Jeremy Horder explicitly endorses pun-
ishment for those who under a counterfactual inquiry would have acted culpably:
[I]n a case of inadvertent wrongdoing, one is found to have been strongly indifferent, [when]
one is found to have been quite prepared to go ahead and commit the wrongdoing even if one
had seen the possibility of it. In such circumstances, what reason could there be for attributing
any normative significance whatsoever to the mere fact of one's (chance) inadvertence?
Jeremy Horder, Gross Negligence and Ciminal Culpability, 47 U. ToRoNTO LJ. 475, 508
(1997). Michaels' conception of acceptance likewise endorses a counterfactual inquiry.
Michaels, supra note 10, at 961.
8 As Duff discusses at one point
But why should liability depend on choice? Because choice, it is thought, is the defining
mark of agency- it marks the point at which we engage in the world as free responsible agents,
and thus bring ourselves within the proper reach of the criminal law ...
We should note that such a conception of responsible agency makes the agent's 'atti-
tudes' or 'feelings' (of indifference, for instance) irrelevant to her criminal liability. What con-
cerns the criminal law is what she chooses to do, not what she feels; for her attitudes and
feelings, while they may motivate or accompany choice and action, do not manifest her volun-
tary will. Feelings are indeed often seen, from this perspective, as essentially passive, non-
rational mental states over which we have little or no voluntary control: I cannot help what I
feel; what I can help, and am responsible for, are my choices.
DUFF, supra note 39, at 154-55.
"7 Alan Michaels defends counterfactual inquiries, arguing that they are already
employed in instances of recklessness and entrapment. Michaels, supra note 10, at
1020-24. As for recklessness, Michaels claims that by judging the defendant against
what a law-abiding person would do, we have adopted a counterfactual inquiry. Id. at
1020-21. This is unconvincing. With recklessness, we are judging the defendant
against a standard, not punishing him based on the prediction of his actions under
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driving her car, and fails to notice John in the crosswalk because
she is too self-absorbed. Now, Simons would say that ifJane would
have continued on anyway, had she in fact seen John, she should
be punished as culpably indifferent, rather than simply negligent.
But let us assume a little history between Jane and John. Jane, in
fact, hates John. Indeed, Jane was driving to John's house, where
she planned to take out her shotgun and murder John. Now, if
we are playing the "what if" game, why stop at culpable indiffer-
ence? Isn't it in fact more likely thatJane would aim atJohn and
purposefully (not culpably indifferently) run him over?
Second, the counterfactual analysis conflicts with our con-
cept of free will. We cannot punish people based on predictions
as to what they would have done; we punish people based on the
culpable choices that they have made. Many actors in a given set
of circumstances might resort to crime, but we will not punish
them until they have actually made that choice and acted on it.
Responsibility should not rest on the prediction of future
choices.ts And, thus, sometimes unfortunately, we must endure
the fact that bad people do not choose to commit bad acts and
we are stuck with accepting that punishment is not appropri-
ate.
90
different circumstances. Regarding entrapment, Michaels avers that predisposition is
determined by a counterfactual inquiry into whether the defendant would have
committed the crime if the government had not become involved. Id. at 1021-24.
This, however, is a causation question. The defendant has committed the crime-we
are not predicting greater culpability. Rather, we are questioning whether the gov-
ernment's intervention caused a crime that otherwise would not have occurred. Our
reliance on counterfactuals in determining causation questions does not justify rely-
ing on counterfactuals to punish defendants based on their hypothetical actions had
they possessed beliefs they did not actually possess. Moreover, our use of counterfac-
tuals in resolving causation questions is itself problematic. See Kessler, supra note 14,
at 2197-99; LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUTY MwnDs 233-36 (1987).
' Samuel Pillsbury also endorses indifference; however, his rationale is quite dif-
ferent from Simons.' Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes of Indifference, 49 RUTGERS L REV.
105 (1996). Drawing on cognitive science literature, Pillsbury contends that failure to
perceive relevant facts may itself be a culpable choice. I contrast Pillsbury's view with
my own infra section IlI.C.
89 See Alexander and Kessler, supra note 10 (advocating the elimination of incom-
plete attempts as they are premised upon the prediction of future wrongdoing and
not the commission of a culpable act).
9' For a further discussion of this bitter pill that we must swallow, see Alexander,
supra note 4, at 950-52.
There are certainly those who worry that not punishing for indifference breeds indif-
ference. Indifferent actors seem to be rewarded for training themselves to be negligent.
This objection can actually be divided into two different concerns. The first is that the
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Finally, query whether Simons can overcome two problems
with his theory that he identifies. The first problem is vague-
ness.9' How do we tell if someone is "culpably indifferent?" For
example, imagine that David is an emergency room doctor who
believes that it is critical for him to be at work on time. Let us
now imagine two individuals, Victor and Peter. Victor is a pedes-
trian who will be hit and killed by David if he runs the light. Peter
is a pedestrian who has been hit by a reckless driver. Peter's life,
let us assume, will be saved if and only if David gets to work on
time. Of course, David does not know about Peter (or Victor) at
the time he chooses to run the light. He just believes that he can
save lives if he gets to work on time. Is David culpably indifferent?
Does he care less about death than he should? Does he care less
about injured pedestrians than he should? Does he care less
about Victor than he should?" Indeed, isn't it a far simpler ques-
law, as formulated, may encourage indifference. We may be telling people that it is bet-
ter for them to be indifferent than for them to parse through the risks they are present-
ing. What should be noted about this concern is its consequentalist nature. Rather than
being concerned with punishing culpable action, this objection fears that we are promot-
ing unwelcome behavior. Our project, however, should first be to determine who the
culpable actors are. If indifferent actors with bad characters do not warrant punishment,
we simply cannot punish them. The criminal law serves to prohibit bad conduct; it is not
a device to make citizens more virtuous. Accord United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d
1196, 1203 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he proper use of the criminal law in a society such as
ours is to prevent harmful conduct for the protection of the law abiding, rather than to
purify thoughts and perfect character.").
The second approach to take towards indifference is to say that it is culpable, but how
can we do that? Indifference is a character trait, an emotion or lack thereof, that the ac-
tor may or may not have any control over. To argue that all indifferent actors deserve to
be punished because they care too little about their fellow man is to punish them for a
trait of character, and commits us very often to punishing the negligent. The hallmark of
criminal responsibility is culpable choice and these actors have not chosen to risk or to
cause harm. But see Pillsbury, supra note 88 (discussing Pillsbury's view of culpable
choice).
Now, the rejoinder to this argument may be that people do have control over their
characters and how they are formed. But here, note that the argument does not place
responsibility on the actor at the time of the indifferent risking of the harm but for the
"culpable choice" of choosing to become an indifferent person. Nevertheless, we still
have the problem that remains from before: those who may embark on a path of
"learned indifference" may not advert to the specific risks that they will eventually run.
Indeed, imagine the difficulty in pinpointing such a culpable choice where character is
formed over time. Cf Sverdlik, supra note 23, at 141 (doubting the ability to pinpoint
a prior culpable choice in most instances of negligence).
" Simons, supra note 72, at 390-91.
Not to split semantic hairs, but the concept of indifference implies awareness.
See WHrrE, supra note 61, at 39. Thus, David cannot be indifferent toward Victor,
whom he does not foresee. Rather, we must think of David as indifferent to human
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don to look at David's choice, not his attitude about that choice,
to determine if he is a culpable actor?
Of course, this hypothetical just touches on the inherent
vagueness of the culpable indifference standard. How can we
punish based not on the actor's choices to do wrong but on his
feelings about the wrong that he is causing? Don't feelings cut
both ways? Can't we wish that we did not have to kill, yet kill pur-
posefully?
9 3
beings at large, or pedestrians (at the very least). Under the Model Penal Code's
formulation, we can easily say that David's risk is unjustifiable, as he is not responding
to an emergency call or traveling in an ambulance. Rather, David's choice to run the
light is based on his speculation that a patient-like Victor-is awaiting him. The in-
difference standard, however, points the other way: it is hard to say that David is in-
different to injured pedestrians. But if David, who runs a light because he thinks his
work is more important than following traffic laws, is not the kind of insensitive actor
whom indifference should capture, who is?
"3 Certainly David's is an easy case if David runs the light because he is on the way
to a Knicks game-here attitude and choice converge. But sometimes, they do not.
What if David is an excessive worrier and regretfully runs a red light because he is late
to pick up his son, imagining that he will do permanent psychological damage to his
son if he is not at the school on time? His attitude may not be indifferent, but his
choice is nevertheless wrong.
Indeed,Judge Bellacosa's dissenting opinion in People v. Roe displaysjust how im-
provident it is to inquire into the feelings of a defendant. 542 N.E.2d 610, 616-20
(N.Y. 1989). There, the defendant played "Polish roulette" with a friend, killed him,
and then mourned his friend's death, clearly regretting his action. Judge Bellacosa
argues that a murder conviction for recklessness demonstrating extreme indifference
to human life is the wrong result, given the defendant's love of his friend. Here, feel-
ings certainly depart from choice. If we care about the defendant's choice to risk the
death of his friend, the murder conviction holds. The defendant pointed a gun at his
friend and fired. This willingness to risk the death of another warrants the murder
conviction, no matter how unhappy the defendant may be with the result of his con-
duct.
Curiously, Alan Michaels appears to agree with Bellacosa's approach to extreme
indifference, arguing that the key question is whether the defendant would have fired
the gun had he known that the death of his friend would result. Michaels, supra note
10, at 1016. But why should we care what the defendant would have done? The de-
fendant, aware of the risk of death to his friend, fired the gun. The fun was in the
risk creation. That he later regrets it (and we can assume he had hoped not to kill his
friend) in no way undermines the extremely culpable choice that was made. Moreo-
ver, to the extent that Michaels relies on Commonwealth v. Malone 47 A.2d 445 (Pa.
1946), to pull at our intuitions that Russian roulette does not alays exhibit a de-
praved heart, the court's use of "fuzzy math" turns a negligence case into one of reck-
lessness-(if the court had credited Malone's testimony that after he inserted the
bullets he did not spin the chamber, it would not have estimated the substantiality of
the risk as it did). It is Malone's negligence, in his failure to appreciate the substanti-
ality of the risk, that tells us he did not act with depraved indifference, not his later
regret.
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The second problem identified by Simons is the "signifi-
cance in action" problem.94 That is, feelings about causing
harm are passive, so how does one tie culpable indifference to
an act? Simons argues that perhaps this desire (or lack thereof)
must be a factor in the actor's practical reasoning in performing
the action.95 Such an approach, however, collapses culpable in-
difference into our current conception of recklessness. The ac-
tor is then making a choice that involves disregarding the
interests of others.9  Alternatively, Simons asserts that the rela-
Russian roulette is the paradigmatic case of indifference. However, this indiffer-
ence is demonstrated by the actor's choice to take a horrible risk, not by the actor's
feelings about that result. Russian roulette players want their friends to live, if only to
play another round.
9' Simons, supra note 72, at 391-94.
Id. at 392.
9 Michael Bratman has evaluated the role of expected (if unwanted) side-effects in
an actor's practical reasoning. BRATMAN, supra note 64, at 139-64. As he explains, "a
rational agent intends all and only those elements of a chosen scenario that are either
the intended end of that scenario or are cited as means to that end." Id. at 156. But
despite the fact that the side-effect is unintended, it is still chosen: "[w]e may assume
that [the actor] will in fact consider this bad upshot in his deliberation and so will
choose a scenario containing that upshot. But he still need not intend that upshot."
Id. at 161. Thus, bad side-effects are part of our practical reasoning and part of our
choice. Thus, if we tie indifference to a failure in the actor's practical reasoning, we
are tying indifference to the actor's reckless choice.
To the extent that Simons is contending that the actor is being blamed for devalu-
ing the interests of others in his practical reasoning, another problem arises. Assume
David runs the red light to get to the Knicks game, and he recognizes that there is a
substantial risk of harm of to others. But his desire to go the game is so great, that he
decides to run the light anyway. I would contend that David is reckless because, al-
though he appreciates the substantiality and unjustifiability of the risk, he chooses to
disregard it. But in deciding to disregard the risk of harm to others, David's practical
reasoning might go a variety of ways: David might value his desire to go the Knicks
game at 100 and the potential harm to others at 10 (in terms of his desire to avoid it).
Or he might value the Knicks game at 10, but the harm to others at 9. 1 would con-
tend that it is the choice, to pick the game over others' interests, whatever the inde-
pendent values of these variables, that makes David's conduct culpable. Simons may
be placing blame earlier in the calculation-to the amount of weight given to the in-
terests of others. David is indifferent because he is not giving the appropriate weight
to the interests of others. But let us assume that David decides not to run the light,
still valuing others' interest at 9, but not a basketball fan, weighing the interest of the
game at 1. Here, David does not run the light, but his value system is still off. Does
Simons wish to punish David for stopping at the light because he gave the interests of
others too little weight? Alternatively, is David indifferent if he reasonably assesses
the value of others' lives at 100 but grossly overvalues the Knicks game at 1000 and
thus runs the light? If so, the indifference is being manifested in choice, not in the
value judgments informing that choice.
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tionship need only be causal.97 Michael Moore has noted the
limitations of such a relationship between desires and actions.
For example, when a man forgets his appointment with his girl-
friend:
... this failure to arrive at the appointed time shows that he does not care,
not that he adopted this behavior as a means to show the woman that he
no longer cares. His emotion, or lack of it, explains his behavior, but does
not mean that he chose, even unconsciously, that specific behavior as the
means of achieving some particular desire.
98
A causal account, moreover, is inherently problematic, as it
opens the floodgates to problems of determinism. Everything is
caused-are we responsible for everything then? Or nothing?
Hence, we should not collapse opaque recklessness into the
character defect of not caring sufficiently about the risk cre-
ated.9 Not only does such a theory allow punishment for one's
character but it also opens up a Pandora's Box of its own. But
since we cannot rely on the character fault of indifference, we
must now reconsider the definition of recklessness set forth by
the Model Penal Code.
I--. FROM OPACITYTO TRANSLUCENCY: PRECONSCIOUS AWARENESS
As we have discussed above, the opaquely reckless actor ad-
verts to some sense of risk but fails to formulate a mental state
with a detailed description of the risk he is presenting. He
knows that running a red light is "dangerous" but fails to think
through why it is dangerous. Nevertheless, does the meaning of
"dangerous" exist in the back of the defendant's mind? Should
we, therefore, rethink whether an actor must "consciously disre-
gard" the substantial and unjustifiable risk?
'7 Simons, supra note 72, at 392.
Moore, supra note 62, at 1631.
For the argument against legal perfectionism, see Heidi M. Hurd, Moral Rights
and Legal Rules: A Natural Law Theory, 6 LEGAL THEORY 423, 434-40 (2000) (arguing
that "a theory of legislation that calls upon us to will our reasons for action calls upon
us to do the impossible" and that "[tt]o mandate (a specific form of virtue] to the ex-
clusion of others, and then to punish persons who substitute other forms for the one
that is mandated, would violate the principle that punishment should track moral de-
sert, for it would impose sanctions on those who, in fact, do their (aretaic) duty").
But cf. Kyron Huigens, Vrtue and Inculpation, 108 HARv. L REv. 1423 (1995) (arguing
for virtue ethics as a rationale for punishment).
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A. THE PRECONSCIOUS
Let us first take a brief, but necessary, detour and look at the
act requirement."° The act requirement mandates that the actor
engage in his conduct voluntarily, meaning, inter alia, that he must
be conscious as opposed to sleeping, in shock, hypnotized, and
the like."" We require that the act be voluntary because we feel
that to hold an actor properly accountable for his conduct, the
conduct must truly be "his."'0  We want the actor to have en-
gaged in reflective self-awareness and have reasoned through his
decision to act. Consequently, to be attributable to the actor,
the conduct must be a voluntary, willed bodily movement. 3
Now, when we choose to engage in an action, are we choos-
ing every discrete part of that action? In other words, when we
choose to act, what is the content of our intentions? For exam-
ple, while I am typing this paper, I think of typing the words. I
do not focus on every finger movement-from pressing down on
one key to moving my hands to reach another key--nor do I
think about each letter that I am typing. Now, some of this be-
havior is learned. When I began typing, I did focus on each let-
ter and in fact had to memorize its place on the keyboard. Now,
if I choose to, I can focus on each individual letter that I am typ-
ing. Yet, I find that I can type far faster if I just focus on the
words, and not on the individual letters. So when I will myself
to type this paper, what is the content of my intention-is it to
type the word, to type the letter, to move my finger...?
In Act and Crime, Michael Moore addresses this question. He
asks:
If we form an intention to throw a curve ball, and that causes us to
throw one, are the discrete movements of our fingers across the lacing on
the ball something we also intend? Or are those movements simply events
that are caused by our intent to throw a curve ball and that themselves
cause the ball to move in a curved flight, but that are not themselves in-
tended?
"O For the rationale behind the act requirement, see generally DRESSLER, supra
note 16, § 9.01 [B], at 70-71; MOORE, supra note 26, at 46-59.
"' See MPC § 2.01 (requiring voluntary act); DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF
CRIMINAL LAw 90-93 (1987) (discussing involuntary conduct); see also People v. New-
ton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 376 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (holding unconsciousness,
even if the defendant physically acts, "a complete defense to a charge of criminal
homicide").




More specifically, how do we draw the line between what a person in-
tends, and what some functionally defined homunculus within him 'in-
tends' to 'do' in order to achieve what the whole person desires?'"
In addressing his question, Moore begins by defining "con-
sciousness." He states that by consciousness, he means "the kind
of awareness we have as an experience."*0 5 Moore distinguishes
both (1) the "preconscious" when routine actions have become so
habitual that we need not focus on them, but we can call them to
mind,'06 and (2) the "unconscious" in the Freudian sense." 7
Moore suggests that we learn many behaviors that we do not
monitor consciously.es Yet Moore concludes that although ac-
tions may have become so routine that they remain in our pre-
conscious-and in fact, may be hard to focus on in our conscious
awareness-the objects of our intentions are discrete bodily
movements.9' As Moore contends, even when we think about
complex actions, we are "dimly aware" of the more discrete bodily
movements that we are undertaking."0 Moore adds that "even
when this dim awareness of the movement is absent, it is nonethe-
less accessible to consciousness. It is preconscious in the sense of
easily called to mind if attention is focused on it, and so remains
part of a person's mental states.""'
This account clearly seems to be correct. With many com-
plex movements, we do not focus on each discrete bodily
movement, just on our over-arching goals. Yet we may choose
" MOORE, supra note 26, at 150-51.
Id. at 151. For further discussion of consciousness, consider.
In sum, consciousness entails present experience, which is such as necessarily to in-
volve a measure of putative intuitional contact with the physical world, whether of positive
or null or merely counterfactual-conditional variety. For some reason as yet undivined, tun-
ing out intuitionally on the physical world is tantamount to tuning out on Reality; that is,
on the voice of Reason-which keeps track of Truth.... It seems the function of con-
sciousness must be to link us attentively to the physical world that contains us.
BRLAN O'SHAUGHNESSY, CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE WORLD 84 (2000).
'G Daniel Dennett uses the term "subconscious," rather than "preconscious." See
D.C. DENNErr, CONTENrr AND CONSCIOUSNESS 128 (1969). I see no reason to choose
between these terms as it is clear both Dennett and Moore are describing the same
thing.
IV MOORE, supra note 26, at 152.
'
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to focus on each individual movement. It is simply the fact that
these behaviors have become so routine, so easy for us, that we
need not pay attention to them. Thus, when someone is driving,
many of his actions are part of his preconscious. The driver no
longer has to focus on how to stay in his lane, how to turn the
wheel, etc. The intention to cause these various bodily move-
ments exists at the preconscious level.
But, turning to the question of mens rea, the driver is also
purposefully engaging in the conduct of driving. Are all the inten-
tions involved in purposefully driving monitored at the conscious
level, or does the preconscious have a role here too? Now, in
keeping with the fact that the driver's discrete intentions regard-
ing individual bodily movements exist in his preconscious, aren't
the rules of the road, the sense of risk, the heuristics of when to
slow down, likewise monitored at the preconscious level? The
driver need not think "red means stop." Or if he is in the right
lane and he sees a biker up ahead, he may immediately try to get
into the left lane. The thought-"the biker might fall" or "the
biker's presence will slow me down"--need not enter the driver's
head. Rather, the driver sees the biker and he concludes: change
lanes. This lane change is purposeful, even if all of the delibera-
tions leading up to the act occur on a preconscious level. Thus,
in the same way that Moore concludes that the object of our voli-
tional intentions are discrete bodily acts but all that we may be
consciously aware of is to "throw the curve ball," likewise, we may
have discrete beliefs, desires, and intentions, yet all we consciously
think is "get out of the way of the bike."
B. THE PRECONSCIOUS AND OPAQUE RECKLESSNESS
Now let us turn to the opaquely reckless actor. The opaquely
reckless actor is conscious of the fact that she is dismissing a dan-
gerous risk; she just has not stopped to think about why it is dan-
gerous. But does the knowledge of why it is dangerous exist in
her preconscious mind?
Let us consider the opaquely reckless actor from the ex ante
perspective. Imagine we could stop the driver just as she hits
the gas to run the light but before she hits the pedestrian. If
asked what she has consciously chosen to do, she will reply: to
engage in risky or dangerous activity. If further inquiry is made,
the driver can immediately prattle off the reasons why running
the light is dangerous. She might say that it is dangerous be-
cause she might cause an accident or hit a pedestrian. The ac-
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tor does not focus on each and every consequence of her ac-
tions; nevertheless, the reasons why her actions are risky are
immediately accessible to her."
2
Contrast, however, the negligent driver, who diverts her at-
tention from the road to change the radio station, never think-
ing that she will fail to look up in time to avoid running a red
light (and thus killing a pedestrian)." If the negligent driver
does not advert to any risk (which, clearly she should have, as
that is what makes her negligent), ex ante, nothing exists in her
mind about any risk that she is running. Sure, she may have
background knowledge about why it is a bad thing to run red
lights, but asking her why it is dangerous to run the red light ex
ante is no different than asking you, the reader, as you sit in your
desk chair, why one should not be running red lights.
Moreover, an actor with a preconscious appreciation of the
risk reacts differently than a negligent actor does. The opaquely
reckless actor may be upset that the harm she risked actually
materialized-in the same way that a purely reckless actor might
react. The negligent actor, on the other hand, is likely to be
surprised by the materialization of the harm."
4
Now that we have descriptively captured opaque reckless-
ness-the actor consciously chooses to engage in risky behavior
and preconsciously recognizes why the behavior is risky, another
question follows. Should we hold the opaquely reckless actor re-
sponsible for the preconscious aspects of her decision-making?
The answer to this question depends on whether the precon-
scious description informs her practical reasoning. If the precon-
scious aspect is part of her choice, she may fairly be held
"2 What if the actor thinks her conduct is risky, but not because it risks the harm
that ultimately materializes? In such an instance, the actor is only negligent vis--a-vis
this harm. I discuss this limitation to opaque recklessness infra notes 119-20 and ac-
companying text.
"' On any given occasion, changing the radio station might demonstrate opaque
recklessness. However, if the actor truly fails to recognize that she is creating a risk of
harm or if she recognizes that changing the radio station takes her eyes off the road
but believes that she is paying sufficient attention to notice any traffic signals, she is
only negligent.
... Certainly, we have all had the experience where we have acted negligently, per-
haps fortunately adverting to the harm before it materializes. For instance, one
might be driving and have failed to see ajaywalking pedestrian. The shock and hor-
ror, as one discovers the fact that she put the pedestrian at risk, is quite a different




accountable for it. Moreover, if we do think that the opaquely
reckless actor can be held accountable for the description of the
risk that exists in her preconscious, then we should reconsider
whether there is any difference in culpability between purely reck-
less and opaquely reckless actors.
To examine the opaquely reckless actor's practical reason-
ing, let us first turn to Julia, who goes shopping to buy clothing
and returns with a red shirt. As discussed above,"' when we say
that Julia intends to buy the red shirt, we may not substitute an-
other description of the red shirt in stating Julia's intention.
That is, just because Julia intends to buy a red shirt does not
mean that Julia intends to buy a product made by child slave la-
bor, even if, in fact, the red shirt is a product of child slave la-
bor.
But perhaps I cheated a bit before. The different descrip-
tions of Julia's purchase-the various "references"-were all of
equal specificity. But, may we say that if Julia intends "to buy a
red shirt" that Julia intends "to buy clothing?" Can we move
from the specific to the general? We can-because we are sub-
stituting "senses" not "references." That is, when Julia thinks of
shirt, she thinks of clothing. "Shirt" has the same "sense" (mean-
ing) as "clothing." Thus, if Julia's mother has forbidden her to
buy any more clothing, Julia is justly held accountable for buy-
ing a shirt because the two descriptions refer to the same object
to Julia.
Why may we substitute the two senses? To fully grasp this,
consider the following from Michael Luntley:
The fundamental insight [that drives the whole conception of sense
and reference] is that if you could factor out grasp of the sense of a singu-
lar term from grasp of the sense of whole sentences, you would have no ac-
count of the rational power of the sense of the singular term. Thinking of
an object is normative. To think of an object is to have your cognitive atti-
tude to it subject to normative rational evaluation. The normativity of
thought consists in the way a thought is systematically connected to oth-
ers.n 6
Lundey's illustration is helpful here. He supposes that in
the middle of a crowded, rowdy meeting, he says, "That heckler
should be ejected." Luntley then suggests:
"' See supra section I.A.
... MICHAEL LUNTLEY, CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF THOUGHT: TRUTH, WORLD,
CONTENT 238 (1999).
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Suppose now that my purported reference and thought about the in-
dividual is not responsive to an enquiry from you as to whom I mean. Sup-
pose you ask if I mean the man with the red hair, or the man behind the
tall security guard, or the man who .... etc., and in response to all these
questions I simply shrug and insist that I simply mean that that heckler
should be ejected. So you then ask if I mean that one there, and you point;
or you ask if I mean the one next to that one there, and you point to a dif-
ferent place. Suppose I still refuse to see any of this as relevant to the
thought I expressed[ .... ] You have offered a series of thoughts to which
you took the truth of my original claim to be sensitive, and I refuse point-
blank to acknowledge any such sensitivity. In the face of my attempt to
hold my original claim insensitive to such further thoughts, it is tempting to
wonder whether I could have really meant anything at all by my original
claim.
The suppositions that I have considered are all ways of revealing the
way in which thought about an object must be sensitive to a cluster of
thoughts that, as it were, provide the triangulation that fixes thought on a
particular. You cannot, for example, demonstratively think about an object
without having some idea of how it stands above, behind and to the side of
other things, for if you did not have some idea about that, you wrould have
no idea of its space-occupancy at all."'
Applying Luntley's reasoning to Julia, when she intends "to
buy a red shirt," she does not simply intend to buy a shirt.
Rather, the shirt has meaning to her. It is the one on the rack,
with the sale tag, with the square collar, etc. And thus the
choice to buy the shirt entails all of these descriptions, all the
different senses or meanings that she gives to the intentional ob-
ject. All of these meanings, notjust one, informJulia's choice.
Luntley shows us that when the red-light runner consciously
engages in activity he considers to be "dangerous," the
thought-"this is dangerous"-must mean something to the
driver. To be rational, the driver, when asked, "Why is this dan-
gerous?", must have an answer-"This action is dangerous be-
cause it risks lives, injury, and property damage." Given that the
actor must have a sense of what he means when he thinks that
an activity is dangerous, it must figure into his practical reason-
ing about whether to engage in the activity. He may have ha-
bitualized the concept of dangerousness, as including risking
harm to other people's lives or property, and therefore, these
specific risks need not consciously enter his decision-making.
"
7 Id. at 236.
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Nevertheless, it is still appropriate to view this underlying con-
ception of dangerousness as part of the actor's decision-making
because "dangerous" must mean something to the actor. It
does not exist in the actor's mind independent of its meaning.
In fact, consider the simplicity of this claim in a different
context. Some theorists have advocated that we do not need the
doctrine of transferred intent."8 They assert that while the de-
fendant intended to kill A, but actually killed B, one need not
transfer the defendant's intent because the defendant's inten-
tion was to kill a person, which is what the statute forbids. Now,
if the defendant claimed, "well, I only thought that I intended
to kill A; I never intended to kill A," such a claim would seem
ludicrous. Of course, the defendant, in choosing to kill A, also
chose to kill a person (and if he did not think so, there are ra-
tionality problems here that would interfere with transferring
the intent). The reason why we may hold the defendant ac-
countable is because the defendant's sense of A is that A is a
person. Thus, as Luntley tells us, thinking about an object is
normative. We must have a sense of what the object is, and that
sense is more than just the one description. So the defendant
when he chooses to kill A, chooses to kill a person, and may be
held accountable for it.
Consequently, when an actor chooses to engage in "danger-
ous activity," the actor chooses to do what "dangerous activity"
means to her. Because this definition of dangerous activity is
part of the actor's decision-making, it is fair and appropriate to
hold her accountable for this definition, just as if she had ex-
plicitly referenced the meaning of the dangerous activity in her
conscious decision-making.
One caveat: the determinative factor here is that the actor's
understanding of "dangerous" includes the appropriate appre-
ciation of the underlying risk. A defendant is merely negligent
if he (1) did not realize his action was dangerous but should
have; (2) realized it was dangerous, but thought the risk of
harm was not substantial; (3) realized it was dangerous but de-
fined dangerous in a way that did not include the harm that oc-
curred." 9 This actor, while engaging in "dangerous" activities, is
,.. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 109; Moore, supra note 18, at 267-68.
"' When dangerousness means only injury or property damage to the actor, we
cannot say he was reckless as to the risk of death. "We should say that two proposi-
tions are the same when the senses (meanings) of the words expressing them are be-
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not reckless vis-5-vis the requisite harm; rather, he is merely neg-
ligent. However, where the actor's sense of the risk does in-
clude, even on a preconscious level, the harm sought to be
prevented, there is no reason to treat him any differently than
the purely reckless actor.1
20
C. THE PRECONSCIOUS AND RESPONSIBILITY
Thus far, we endeavored to describe opaque recklessness,
finding that it is part conscious, part preconscious, decision-
making. We have also explored whether this kind of decision-
making is sufficient for responsibility. To this point, however,
all of our examples have focused on conduct that is monitored
at the conscious level. I consciously choose to type; the driver
consciously chooses to drive; the opaquely reckless actor con-
sciously chooses to engage in dangerous behavior. But what of
the actor who makes the decision entirely at the preconscious
level?
Here, the question is whether we should hold someone re-
sponsible for risks to which he never consciously adverts, but
simply dismisses while on automatic pilot. For instance, when
driving, an actor makes many preconscious choices, without no-
ticing a pedestrian, another car, or a cyclist. Yet the actor may
engage in conduct that imposes substantial and unjustifiable
risks on these people. Should this risk-taking, created without




lieved to be the same by the holder of the mental states in question." Moore, supra
note 18, at 259. Thus, typically, it is fair to say that if A intends to remain "an unmar-
ried man," he also intends to remain "a bachelor." Id. at 250. But, if the actor does
not hold the two words to mean the same thing, the senses may not be substituted.
For example, the Pope may intend to remain an unmarried man, yet not consider
himself a bachelor. (This example is from Gilbert Harman, Doubts about Conceptual
Analysis, in PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 45 (M. Michael &J. O'Leary-Hawthorne eds., 1994)).
'' I would also not draw a distinction between pure recklessness and opaque reck-
lessness in the context of depraved heart murders. In those situations where the
opaquely reckless actor has acted with extreme indifference to human life, there is no
reason not to hold her responsible for murder. In some circumstances, the fact that
the description of the harm was opaque may suggest that the actor was not extremely
indifferent. But the maniacal driver who thinks his actions are fun because they are
extremely dangerous should not escape full responsibility because it was only at the
preconscious level that he appreciated the risk of death he was creating.
1. Larry Alexander has previously considered this issue:
Michael Moore, in private conversation, pressed me on what kind of consciousness
or awareness of risk I require for recklessness. In particular. can a defendant be reckless if
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In this area, the discussion of sense, on which we hung our
hat for resolving opaque recklessness, is of little utility because
the question is not whether given one conscious "sense," an-
other preconscious "sense" may be substituted. Rather, the
question is whether choices made by the preconscious actor are
a type of choice for which we may hold the actor responsible.
This turns on the importance of consciousness. As noted be-
fore, we do not hold actors accountable for actions taken while
sleepwalking and the like. Why is consciousness so fundamen-
tal?
Consider Michael Moore's solution to the question of
whether one is responsible for unconscious action. For exam-
ple, should someone be executed for dreaming about killing
the emperor? 22 Moore concludes that responsibility for uncon-
scious "actions" violates the moral principle that "'ought' im-
plies 'can"':
Whatever else the principle of responsibility might include, it should
include the power or ability to appraise the moral worth of one's proposed
actions. A person has such ability only if he has moral and factual knowl-
edge of what he is doing and is able to integrate the two to perceive the
moral quality of his action. One who lacks this ability cannot fairly be
blamed because, although he is acting intentionally, he does not know that
what he is doing is wrong./
Thus, for us to believe that the actor is responsible, she
must be able to reason through her actions and choose to do
wrong. Where there is no choice; there is no responsibility.
But preconscious decision-making is different than punish-
ing for the unconscious. The problem in punishing the uncon-
scious lies in the failure of the actor to have any control over
whether she does wrong. But the preconscious is another mat-
he "believes" that a risk exists, in the sense that he is disposed to act responsively to it, but is
not fully conscious of that risk? We have often had the experience of driving successfully
down a road for several minutes without being able to recall anything about our driving.
We obviously adverted to the risks along the way and responded to them, but we were not
fully conscious of them at the time and later cannot recall them. Aspects of riding a bicycle
and other habitual activities frequendy fall below the level of full consciousness. I am in-
clined to deem such low-level consciousness of risk to be sufficient for recklessness culpa-
bility, although I would want to consider the issue more fully than I have. My principal
reservation about deeming low-level consciousness of risk sufficient for recklessness is that
the actor may not have an adequate sense of the risk's magnitude, as opposed to its pres-
ence, to regard him as culpably indifferent.
Alexander, supra note 4, at n.62.
' Moore, supra note 62, at 1619 (discussing this example of Freud's).
123 Id. at 1624 (footnotes omitted).
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ter. There, the actor is, at some level, aware of the risk pre-
sented, or is she? Such a question depends on two different
meanings of the word, "aware," as Daniel Dennett has pointed
out.124 Dennett reveals that when we use the term, "aware," we
may mean two different things.'2 The first sense we have of the
term is introspective; the second is behavioral.' A man swerves
to avoid a tree, and he can report to us that he was aware that a
tree was in his way and therefore he moved.'- Likewise, a bee
may swerve to avoid a tree, obviously aware that an obstacle is in
its way, but as Dennett questions, "[w]as the bee aware of the
tree as a tree, or just as an obstacle?"' ' The man is aware of the
tree both as an introspective reason for avoiding the tree and as
a behavioral reason to avoid an obstacle.'2 The bee, on the
other hand, does not introspect and decide to avoid the tree,
but behaviorally, the bee is aware of some obstacle (the tree).'9
Applying this analysis to our driver on auto pilot, he is not aware
in the introspective sense of the curves of the road, but is aware
in the behavioral sense of these curves, thus his ability to navi-
gate them.' 3'
Which level of awareness should suffice for responsibility?
Well, Moore dismissed responsibility for the unconscious be-
cause it violates "'ought' implies 'can."' Does the preconscious
fall victim to the same problem? It does. As Dennett notes,
animals can only be aware on the behavioral level, not on the
introspective level, because they lack the propositional attitudes
132 Ta s
that people have, That is, the introspective sense of awareness
can be defined as:
A is [introspectively aware] that p if and only if p is the content of the
input state of A's speech center at time 133
Whereas, behavioral awareness is defined as:
'2'DENNEhT, supra note 106, at 116-18.






'S3 Id. at 117-18.
" Id. at 120 ("People are [behaviorally aware] of things, but also are [introspec-
tively aware] of things, a possibility ruled out in the case of dumb animals.").
"Id. at 118.
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A is [behaviorally aware] that p at time t if and only if p is the content
of an internal event in A at time t that is effective in directing current be-
havior.
34
Thus, when we act from the preconscious, we are only be-
haviorally aware of obstacles. To be introspectively aware, we
must trigger our speech center and recognize these obstacles as
what they are: curves in the road, pedestrians, or other drivers.
Without triggering our speech centers, we are not reasoning
through our actions and are not appraising their moral worth.
To hold us responsible in such cases would be to violate
"'ought' implies 'can.'"' 35
But we have another reason why the preconscious actor
might be responsible. She chooses to delegate her decision-
making to her preconscious. If one chooses to leave one's child
in the care of an unconscious (asleep, comatose?) babysitter,
one is responsible for that choice. Should one be responsible
for leaving one's actions in the care of one's auto pilot? Indeed,
consider State v. Baker,3" where the court held that the delega-
tion of control over the car's speed to the cruise control sufficed
to count as a voluntary act."' Why should an actor be less re-
sponsible for those risks that she creates while on auto pilot,
given her voluntary choice to be on auto pilot (or at least her
ability to prevent being on auto pilot while driving)?
But this gets us back to the classic conundrum discussed
earlier. That is, when looking for a prior culpable choice, we
must find (1) that such a prior culpable choice was made and
(2) that at the time that choice was made, the actor acted with
the degree of culpability necessary for responsibility for the
harm that later occurred. Does the driver choose to daydream?
If she does, does she advert to the fact that in so doing, she
might later fail to recognize a substantial and unjustifiable risk?
134 Id.
"' The preconscious and negligence are very similar in this regard. The precon-
scious actor, if she turns her attention to it, can avoid harm. Likewise, the negligent
actor, but for some unreasonable calculation or lack of foresight, can also avoid
harm. In both cases, however, the conscious mind fails to tell the actor that there is
anything wrong with the actor's current behavior. Thus, neither is culpable.
136 571 P.2d 65 (Kansas Ct. App. 1977).
117 To be sure, the decision in Baker is problematic, as the court unconvincingly
distinguishes the case at bar from brake and accelerator failures by the defendant's
delegation to an inessential device. See Douglas Husak & Brian P. McLaughlin, Time-




Probably not. Thus, while the driver whose cruise control sticks
may be held responsible for the strict liability crime of speeding,
we could not punish her for recklessness, absent a choice be-
yond the choice to use the cruise control.
Finally, consider Samuel Pillsbury's twist on our view of
choice, perception, and awareness. 'ss Pillsbury, an indifference
proponent, disagrees with the standard conception of choice
and argues that our reliance on awareness is misplaced because
it rests on the assumption that perception is passive. He con-
tends that, "[r]ecognizing that perception represents a learned
activity brings it closer to our conception of choice. " "" Thus,
since we choose how much attention to devote to any given sub-
ject, we may properly be faulted for our perception deficits
when we lack a good reason for our failure to recognize obvious
risks.'40 Consequently, when we "choose" not to pay attention
because we are "indifferent" rather than because we have a
good reason for our attention failure, Pillsbury argues this indif-
ference, even without advertence to the risk, should be suffi-
cient for both manslaughter and depraved heart murder.'
Why may we be faulted for our failures of perception? Pills-
bury argues that responsibility is appropriate regardless of
whether (1) the decision about whether to pay attention is
made at the time of the act, (2) our "perception priorities" were
determined in the past, or (3) our "perception priorities" are
unchosen products of our environment and the like. Consid-
ering these possibilities in turn, each has its own failings. First,
examine Pillsbury's argument that the actor is responsible for
not paying attention because "he chooses" not to pay attention.
Well, who is the "he" here? Is it the actor's conscious decision
or is it a preconscious decision?'43 If we make many choices on
" See generally Pillsbury, supra note 88.
Id. at 143.
4 Id. at 152 ("Culpability should depend on [the actor's] reasons for perceptive
failure, not on the failure itself.").
141 Id. at 206-13.
'
42 Id. at 144-53.
Compare Michael Moore's discussion about the psychology of perception:
Recent work in the field has shown how much intelligent information preprocessing
one does before the information is sent up the optic nerve to the brain. Such information
processing gives the appearance of being inferences drawn from beliefs that are formed
from the stimuli one receives. However, this does not mean that one actually knows these
inferences. One's personal self does not know these things because the extended memory.
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the preconscious level, or as Michael Moore explored-the un-
conscious level-the question still remains whether these choices
are the kinds of choices upon which to rest moral responsibility.
When we "choose" not to pay attention, are we doing the choos-
ing in a morally significant way?
Even if this choice were properly attributable to the actor, it
falls victim to the same problem as Pillsbury's second argument.
If we make self-conscious choices about our "perception priori-
ties," we still must find the requisite degree of culpability. When
an actor learns to be selfish, to what extent does he appreciate
that he might cause future harm? Perhaps we could accept
Pillsbury's claim if it were limited to distinguishing between
types of negligent actors-selfish inadvertence may be worse
than clumsy inadvertence. But Pillsbury is willing to replace
recklessness with negligence plus indifference. Under Pills-
bury's regime, an actor who embarks on a path of selfishness,
never recognizing that this selfishness might result in death to
others, may find herself guilty of manslaughter.
Finally, Pillsbury anticipates our next complaint-that indif-
ference, or the roots thereof, may be an unchosen character
trait. Untroubled by the steepness of this slippery slope, Pills-
bury accepts that "perception priorities may be neither con-
sciously nor freely chosen." 44 He views this determinism as no
different than punishing people for their motivations, for which
he believes we are responsible. I, however, would dispute this
view of responsibility. So long as we are rational and not
compelled, we have the ability to evaluate our choices and de-
cide whether to violate the law's commands. That I am lazy or
poor or greedy may make my choice somewhat harder than it is
for others, but this choice is still completely within my control.
But to blame people for why they have not seen risks-their per-
ception priorities-when these priorities may themselves be
unchosen, conflicts with any conception of free will worth hav-
ing.
Pillsbury, I believe, would argue that I have placed far too
great an emphasis on the conscious/preconscious distinction.
the device by which one integrates new beliefs or other mental states into one's personal
self, is not operative.
Moore, supra note 62, at 1608.
"' Pillsbury, supra note 88, at 151.
'4' Id. at 150-51.
640 [Vol. 91
OPAQUE RECKLESNESS
Drawing on Dennett and others, he shows us that "[t ] he line be-
tween aware and unaware mental activity appears very much a
matter of degree."146 But this difference in degree is where re-
sponsibility rests. We are not responsible for our heartbeats,
even if our body and mind control them, nor are we responsible
for our dreams, despite our unconscious control over them.
What we are responsible for are those actions that we can do
something about-where we can decide whether to act. And to
have this sort of control, we must be aware, in the introspective
sense, of what we are doing.
We have now considered whether preconscious decision-
making is itself sufficient for responsibility. We have concluded
that consciousness plays a critical role, realizing that placing re-
sponsibility on the preconscious violates "'ought' implies 'can.'"
We have also explored alternative means for holding the pre-
conscious actor responsible-looking to prior culpable choices
and to failures in perception priorities. We have concluded that
any prior choice likely lacks the requisite degree of culpability
and that the "choice" of perception priorities is elusive. How-
ever, nothing in this Section undermines the fact that the
opaquely reckless actor should be considered reckless whenever
the actor recognizes on a conscious level that her behavior is
risky and is aware on a preconscious level why her conduct is
risky. We now turn to the doctrinal implications of our conclu-
sions about opaque recklessness.
IV. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS
A. MODIFYING THE MODEL PENAL CODE
We have determined that opaque recklessness suffices for
criminal responsibility where the opaquely reckless actor
(1) consciously adverts to the dangerous nature of her conduct
and (2) preconsciously understands that her conduct is danger-
ous because it presents a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
either a material element exists or will result from her conduct.
Under these circumstances, there is no principled reason to dis-
tinguish opaquely reckless actors from the purely reckless.
..6 Id. at 147.
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Hence, we need to change the definition of recklessness in the
Model Penal Code to encompass opaque recklessness." 7
First, note that the Code itself acknowledges that precon-
scious acts are not the same as conscious acts. In defining vol-
untary acts, the Code makes a distinction between those acts
that are "conscious" and those acts that are "habitual," although
both suffice for voluntariness. "8 Given the Code's acknow-
ledgement that the preconscious is not the same thing as the
conscious, the use of the word "conscious" in the definition of
recklessness excludes opaquely reckless actors.
If we wish to abandon consciousness as a prerequisite, how
should we structure recklessness? There are three requirements
that the definition must meet. First, the definition must be suf-
ficiently broad to capture opaque recklessness. Second, it must
maintain the distinction between reckless conduct and negli-
gent conduct. Currently, a reckless actor "consciously disre-
gards" a risk, while a negligent actor "should be aware of a
risk."4 9 Any definition must maintain recklessness' subjectivity.
Third, the definition cannot encompass decision-making that is
entirely unconscious or preconscious, else we violate the princi-
ple that "'ought' implies 'can."'
With these requirements in mind, let us consider three pos-
sible options. One possible approach would be to simply delete
"consciously." Then, the definition of recklessness would read:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an of-
fense when she disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a material
element exists or will result from her conduct, yet nevertheless engages in
such conduct.
Does this definition meet the three requirements? Applying
the second requirement first, the use of the word "disregard"
"' It should be noted preliminarily that the Model Penal Code's definition is currently
not a model of clarity. For example, query whether the actor must consciously disregard
both the risk's unjustifiability and its substantiality. See Treiman, supra note 4, at 365;
Joshua Dressier, Does One Mens Rea Fit All?: Thoughts on Alexander's Unified Conception of
Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REv. 955 (2000) (arguing that "'substantial' should not be
read as an adjective modifying 'risk,' but rather as an adverb modifying 'unjustified
risk"'). Whatever the answer to this question, we have discovered that the actor need not
"consciously disregard" it.
"' See MPC § 2.01 (2) (d); see also Bruce Ledewitz, Mr. Carroll's Mental State or What is
Meant by Intent, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 71, 80-81 (2001) ("the inclusion of habitual acts
as voluntary suggests that voluntary acts need not manifest self-awareness").
". SeeMPC §§ 2.02(2) (c)-(d)
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seems necessarily to imply awareness. How can one disregard
that which one does not know?'50 Hence, using the word, "dis-
regard" still requires the requisite subjective mens rea. Does it
cover opaque recklessness without encompassing uncon-
scious/preconscious decision-making? It does seem to cover
opaque recklessness. The opaquely reckless actor does disre-
gard a substantial and unjustifiable risk, but note that she does
it at just the level that should not alone suffice for responsibil-
ity-in her preconscious. Thus, this definition does not distin-
guish between opaque recklessness and
preconscious/unconscious decision-making.
What if we try to parallel the definition of recklessness with
that of negligence and use "awareness?" The definition of reck-
lessness would then read:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an of-
fense when she is aware that there is a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
a material element exists or will result from her conduct, yet nevertheless
engages in such conduct.
Here, we immediately run into the confusion that Dennett
has identified. What conception of awareness do we mean? If
we mean introspective awareness, this definition only encom-
passes the purely reckless and not the opaquely reckless. If we
mean behavioral awareness, once again we cannot distinguish
between opaque recklessness and preconscious/unconscious
decision-making. Accordingly, this definition fails the third re-
quirement.
Finally, why not create a new mental state?'5' In the same
way that the Model Penal Code allows willful blindness with an
explicit definition of what that encompasses (to be equated with
knowledge), we can carve out opaque recklessness, give an ex-
plicit definition, and equate that with recklessness. Thus, we
might add the following to the Code:
15 See also WHITE, supra note 61, at 31-46 (arguing that indifference and reckless-
ness require awareness).
... One argument against carving out opaque recklessness is simply the concern
that we theorists keep creating new mental states, thus turning the Model Penal
Code's simplicity into a patchwork of mental states as confused as the common law. I
am certainly amenable to drafting the definition of recklessness in order to encom-
pass opaque recklessness. However, as I am unaware of any way to capture highly
culpable opaquely reckless actors in the definition of recklessness without also en-
snaring preconscious actors in the net, I advocate the addition of this mental state.
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Where the evidence does not establish that the actor consciously dis-
regarded the risk, but the actor (1) consciously recognized that her con-
duct was dangerous; (2) at some level appreciated that the reason why her
conduct was dangerous was because it presented a substantial and unjusti-
fiable risk that a material element existed or would result from her con-
duct; 15 2 and (3) she nevertheless chose to engage in the conduct, the actor
is reckless. The actor is not reckless where she (1) did not realize her ac-
tion was dangerous but should have; (2) realized it was dangerous, but
thought the risk of harm was not substantial or unjustifiable; or (3) realized
it was dangerous but defined dangerous in a way that did not include the
harm that occurred.
This definition preserves the subjectivity of recklessness,
covers opaque recklessness, and does not include decision-
making at the preconscious/unconscious level. This definition
should be included within the Model Penal Code so that
opaquely reckless actors do not escape responsibility for those
risks they take, however opaque their choices.
B. PRACTICAL CONCERNS
The question that naturally follows is whether such a test is"
workable. What jury could possibly understand the instruction
above? Although the "cute" response would be to question
whether juries ever understand instructions, let me take a more
serious approach. First, opaque recklessness aids prosecutors
making charging decisions. While prosecutors may often bring
charges of recklessness based on circumstantial evidence of the
risk involved, opaque recklessness allows them to charge culpa-
ble defendants in those cases where the actors claim not to have
focused on the risk. For example, if a defendant runs a stop
sign while talking on his cellular phone and kills a small child,
perhaps the prosecutor should think twice about whether this is
simply negligence. After all, if the defendant recognized he
should not be talking on a cell phone, the next question is why.
Because he might become distracted? And why is that wrong?
Because he might cause an accident that results in death. While
I do not mean to imply that all accidents are actually instances
of opaque recklessness, there are those cases where an actor
should be held accountable-where the actor is aware that he is
52 But see supra notes 4 and 147 (discussing opposing views of whether both sub-
stantiality and unjustifiability are and should be required).
'" See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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presenting some risk and preconsciously recognizes the specific
risk presented.
But my definition is more than just an aid for prosecutors.
While this definition seems difficult in the abstract, this criticism
may be made of all the mens rea definitions contained in the
Model Penal Code. We must remember that these rules are ap-
plied in specific cases to particular facts. So let us return to the
defendant on the cell phone. He is charged with manslaughter
because he was reckless vis-4-vis death. He counters, arguing
that he never foresaw that talking on a cell phone would cause
him to kill a child. On cross, the prosecutor manages to elicit
admissions that the defendant recognized that talking on a cell
phone might distract him, that he might miss traffic signals, and
the like.
The jury then applies the test: First, the evidence does not
establish that the defendant consciously disregarded the risk of
death, but there is evidence that (1) he consciously recognized
that his conduct was dangerous (he knew talking on a cell
phone distracted him); (2) on some level he appreciated why
his conduct was dangerous: it presented the substantial and un-
justifiable risk that he might kill someone (if the jury finds that
the defendant recognized that distractions lead to accidents, ac-
cidents lead to death); and (3) he nevertheless chose to engage
in the conduct. Now, the negligence caveat: (1) Did the driver
fail to realize that he might kill someone even if he should have?
(2) Did he fail to appreciate the substantiality (meaning the
probability that death might result) or the unjustifiability of the
risk he was presenting? (3) Did he recognize that his conduct
was dangerous but fail to recognize it was dangerous because it
might lead to an accident causing death? The defendant will
argue that he did not realize, even preconsciously, that death
would result; the prosecutor will contend the defendant was
opaquely reckless; and the jury will decide.
Obviously, such an instruction will only be given in those
cases where it is necessary, just as a willful blindness instruction
is only given in specific kinds of cases. But such an instruction is
necessary if we want to guarantee that those opaquely reckless
actors who preconsciously appreciate the risks involved are held
accountable for their actions and do not slip between the cracks
in the Model Penal Code.
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C. THOUGHTS ON FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
The conundrum I set forth to address here is opaque reck-
lessness. That is, I challenged the Model Penal Code on a de-
scriptive level, advancing the theory that risks are often not
"consciously" disregarded. I then addressed the normative im-
plications of my theory, contending that while preconscious de-
cision-making is not sufficient for liability, opaque recklessness,
which involves conscious and preconscious thought, is as culpa-
ble as, and should be punished equally to, pure recklessness.
The lessons learned in solving opaque recklessness may pre-
sent both new problems and new solutions for other areas of the
law. I will address these areas briefly. My task, however, is one
of identifying areas, not of resolving all the implications of this
piece.
1. Actus Reus: Habit
In my discussion of the preconscious, I averred that a pre-
conscious choice should not be sufficient for responsibility. But
what implications does my view have on habit? If habit is an act
monitored at the preconscious level and the preconscious is not
sufficiently part of decision-making for responsibility, should
habit be considered an "involuntary" act?
At the outset, note that most habitual conduct has a con-
scious aspect to it. While I may type the letter "t" out of habit, I
am very conscious of each and every word that I am typing.
Thus, to the extent that habit coincides with a conscious mental
state, punishment certainly seems appropriate. Moreover, caus-
ally complex crimes are committed at the conscious, not the
preconscious level. We do not habitually pull the trigger, break
and enter, force intercourse, or sell narcotics."" Indeed, while
the separation of actus reus and mens rea promotes a dualist view
of personhood, the bottom line is that both elements entail the
same sense of consciousness. Since the Model Penal Code re-
quires consciousness for purpose, knowledge, and reckless-
ness,155 habitual conduct will be accompanied by a conscious
Mens rea.
"' Zimmerman contemplates that habitual criminal behavior is possible and con-
cludes that in such cases, advertence is unnecessary. This assertion, however, is a
mere aside to his attack on finding negligent people to be morally responsible for the
harms they have caused. See Zimmerman, Moral Responsibility, supra note 27, at 422.
,' See MPC §§ 2.02(2) (a)-(c).
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Thus, the problematic instances are those involving negli-
gence and strict liability. In these cases, the actor is neither
consciously choosing to act, nor is she consciously choosing any
result. We punish littering, running stop signs, and speeding,
without the purpose to do so. Since punishment for these
crimes is typically justified on consequentalist grounds at the
outset, these grounds will likely supply sufficient support for
punishing habit. Alternatively, query whether the actor's acqui-
sition of the habit suffices to serve as the voluntary act. How-
ever, for those of us that adopt a choice-based view of
responsibility, whether we focus on the mens rea or the actus reus,
the lack of consciousness involved in these cases is very prob-
156lematic.
2. Mens Rea: Purpose
But some will think I have acted too hastily in limiting the
implications of my view to negligence and strict liability. What if
the defendant claims to have intended to pull the trigger but
not to have truly focused on the death that would result? Can
the defendant claim this result was not his "conscious object?"'5 7
Frequently, we probably do not confront this question
head-on because itjust sounds ridiculous. Whatjury will believe
a defendant's claim that he intended to fire the gun at X but
did not intend X's death? Additionally, in dealing with pur-
poseful action, we automatically engage in the substitution of
senses, without even acknowledging that is what we are doing.
As mentioned above, those theorists who argue that we need
not transfer intent because the defendant always intends to kill
a person-which is all that the statute requires-are trading on
the different senses of the defendant's conscious object.' s That
is, we say the defendant intended to kill Z; the defendant be-
lieved Z to be a human being; and therefore the defendant in-
tended to kill a human being. Finally, query whether the
common law's presumption that one intends the natural and
probable consequences of his acts, however abused currently to
'" I do not mean to say that speeding is not worthy of punishment. However, we
typically speed purposefully or knowingly-we are often very aware of how fast we are
going. But we are also given tickets on those rare occasions when we simply fail to no-
ice how fast we are going. I believe these tickets to be only consequentially justified.
7 SeeMPC § 2.02(2) (a) (defining "purpose").
,5 See discussion supra note 118 and accompanying tCXL
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encompass negligence, once was a crude articulation of the sub-
stituting of one sense for another.5 9 Hence, it seems that we
have a handle on purpose and the preconscious.
Nevertheless, in a recent article, Bruce Ledewitz has strug-
gled with just this dilemma.1" He tries to answer the age-old
question: what was Mr. Caroll's mental state?'6 ' Commonwealth v.
Carroll is a classic first-degree murder case. 6 ' The defendant,
Mr. Carroll, got into a fight with his wife, grabbed a gun from
the windowsill at the head of their bed, and fired two shots into
the back of his wife's head.Iss Carroll argued on appeal that he
had not premeditated the murder or even intended to kill
her.'r To support his claim, Carroll presented psychiatric tes-
timony about his wife's abusive personality (and behavior to-
wards their children) and about the "reflexive" nature of his
actions. ' While the majority affirmed Carroll's conviction,
t6
Ledewitz takes Carroll's claim seriously and asks:
While consciousness might be considered a different mental state
from intention, consciousness also does not seem to be satisfied by Carroll.
At the time of the shooting, Carroll did not have a conscious object; nor
was he aware that death would result; and he was not consciously disregard-
ing the risk-that is, if the words conscious and aware are meant to de-
scribe an internal mental state of some kind. ... But Carroll was not aware
at the moment that he was shooting his wife, or that he was shooting at
all.
67
For his part, Ledewitz takes an extreme approach to resolv-
ing this question. Ledewitz, drawing on Wittengenstein, argues
that intentions are evanescent: we do not "intend" as an experi-
ence; we can lie to ourselves and others about what intentions
"9 Cf. Ledewitz, supra note 148, at 102-104 (advocating abandoning intention in fa-
vor of this presumption, among others).
161 See id.
161 See id.
162 194 A.2d 911 (Pa. 1963).
"' Id. at 913-14.
16 4 Id. at 916-17.
1
65 Id.
6' Id. at 918.
167 Ledewitz, supra note 148, at 90. Ken Simons asks a similar question regarding
the mens rea of Bernhard Goetz: "In the suddenness of the encounter, his mind may
have been a blur. Did he therefore lack the 'conscious' object of killing [the vic-
tims]?"). Kenneth W. Simons, Self-Defense, Mens Rea, and Bernhard Goetz, 89 COLUM. L.
REv. 1179, 1194 (1989) (reviewing GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE:
BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL (1988)).
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are; and we can intend without self-reporting.'6 He concludes
that "[i] n light of the evanescence of intention, its use in crimi-
nal law seems unwarranted in general and certainly unwar-
ranted as the critical test of liability and punishment.""" He
advocates instead the reliance on presumptions.'"
Is such a drastic conclusion warranted? We can agree with
Ledewitz that we often have "a jumble of thoughts, suppressed
thoughts, fears and wishes," without abandoning our view of
mental states." Philosophy of mind and cognitive science cer-
tainly have a great deal to teach us about how humans think,
and materialists certainly pose challenges to the law's folk psy-
chology'7 Nevertheless, the easy cases abound. We frequently
know when we act intentionally. Many a murderer contem-
plates her killing, selects her weapon, and specifically recounts
the act.
7-
On the other hand, Carroll is a hard case. The problem
with Carroll is trying to understand in the first instance what was
going on in the defendant's mind. Was it totally blank? The
question of when behavior is reflexive is a difficult one. Take
'0 Ledewitz, supra note 148, at 94-97.
"6 Id. at 97.
'7 Id. at 101-07 ("There was such a general presumption at common lavw-that
someone was presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his ac-
tions. If broadly utilized, this presumption could operate precisely to avoid fruitless
inquiry into mental processes that we really do not understand and probably do not
care about.") (footnotes omitted). Interestingly, Ledeuitz's argument rings of Duff:
"intention is already present in the natural and probable consequences of actions" id.,
but Ledewitz, unlike Duff, does not advance his own metaphysical theory-he simply
abandons the search for intentions.
171 Id. at 101.
'7 See Andrew E. Lelling, Comment, Eliminative Materialsm, Neuroscence and the
Criminal Law, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1471 (1993).
"7 Moreover, to the extent that Ledewitz is motivated by the scenario he sets forth
at the beginning of his paper-one in which two men spray bullets in a police station,
but the judge dismisses the attempted murder count because the prosecution could
not show intent to kill, Ledewitz, supra note 148, at 71-72--,e need not abandon in-
tentions to solve this problem. Certainly these men were aware of the officers inside
when they acted, irrespective of whether they acted because "they hated all police of-
ficers" or they were just "mad at things in general." Id. at 73. In such a case, these
men were reckless. Ledewitz's intuition that they should be treated as if they had at-
tempted murder is correct because as here, where the defendants' behavior manifests
an extreme indifference to human life, the defendants should be punished the same
as if they had succeeded-as murderers. We do not need to determine whether the),
intended to kill, or abandon intent because it fils us in this instance. We simply
need to abandon our attachment to results.
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People v. Newton.74 There we see very purposeful action. The
defendant, after being shot in the stomach by a police officer,
shoots another officer and then takes himself to the hospital.75
There, perhaps because the injury was physical, the appellate
court was willing to credit science and deal with the repercus-
sions of viewing this very purposeful behavior as reflexive."O
Carroll, a case from the 1960s, was not willing to venture into
the psychological realm, where an abusive wife might create a
reflexive defensive action by her husband. Indeed, the court's
hostility toward psychiatry is pronounced.
77
So, maybe Carroll did act out of reflex, and I am not trou-
bled by the consequences of this view.' 78 If he acted out of re-
flex, he is no different than Huey Newton or sleepwalkers and
other automatons. Whether these actors have not "acted" or are
simply excused is a matter of line drawing, and the subject for
others' work. But whatever Mr. Carroll's mental state, it pres-
ents the rare case where action is causally complex, purposeful,
and reflexive, 179 and it should not scare us into abandoning
mental states altogether.
3. Mens Rea: Knowledge
Having discussed the ramifications of my view on both habit
and purpose, let me close by considering the implications for
knowledge. More than any other mental state, knowledge re-
quires awareness at the conscious level. The reason is simple.
Knowledge without awareness is negligence. We "know" that we
should not run red lights, should watch for pedestrians, and
should leave signs out when we mop the floor, but if we fail to
attend to these tidbits at the moment we act, we are negligent.
We have failed to draw on our background knowledge. Thus,
the preconscious, it seems, has little relation to knowledge.
17, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1970)
171 Id. at 370-73.
17. Id. at 376.
'77 194 A.2d at 917-18.
178 Ledewitz does not seem to consider the idea that the court got the answer
wrong: "Carroll shot his wife without previously thinking about it, in a kind of blank
mental state. For the court, these 'facts' satisfied the standard of intent to kill." Le-
dewitz, supra note 148, at 104.
'7 This question truly highlights the thin line between aclus reus and mens rea.
Consciousness is part of one's act and part of one's mental state.
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While this conclusion is correct, it may not seem so at first.
For example, what of the federal drug laws that require only
knowledge that the substance is a drug, and thus allow convic-
tion on the defendant's false belief that the drug is marijuana,
when it is actually cocaine?' 0 Certainly, this approach has the
tenor of an opaque recklessness problem.
To explore this issue, let us assume that Mary possesses co-
caine, but believes it to be marijuana. Federal law will only re-
quire that Mary know that she possesses a drug, but the
prosecutor need not prove that Mary knew the type of drug.
While this conclusion may seem obvious at first because the
statute itself only requires that the defendant know that she pos-
sesses a controlled substance,' 8' fairness concerns are raised by
the fact that the type of drug is a factor in the length of the sen-
tence.S2
We do say that if Mary believes she is carrying marijuana
that she also believes that she is carrying a drug, thus substitut-
ing one sense of the object (marijuana) for another (a drug).
But the fairness concern at the heart of the matter is not that
Mary is opaquely reckless about what she is carrying. Rather,
Mary is operating under a mistake of fact. Thus, given the po-
tentially disparate penalties involved, we must assess whether
Mary is to be punished for what she did or what she believed she
was doing. However one wants to answer this question, the pre-
conscious is not implicated.
"" See; e.g., United States v. Kairouz, 751 F.2d 467, 468 (1st Cir. 1985) ("What is of
essence to establish this element of the offense is that the substance be controlled....
not which one of the proscribed substances it happens to be."); United States v. Lopez-
Martinez, 725 F.2d 471, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that the defendant must be-
lieve that she possessed a controlled substance but need not know "the exact nature"
of the substance"); United States v. Morales, 577 F.2d 769, 776 (2d Cir. 1978) ("[T]he
law is settled that a defendant need not know the exact nature of a drug in his posses-
sion to violate § 841(a)(1), it is sufficient that he be aware that he possesses some
controlled substance.").
'' 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) makes it a crime "to manufacture, distribute, or dispense,
or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled sub-
stance."
"8 See Richard Singer, The Model Penal Code and TAree Two (Possibly Only One) Wa)s
Courts Avoid Mens Rea, 4 BuFF. GRIM. L. RE,. 139, 151 (2000) (arguing that this ap-
proach "led to appalling results .... [A defendant] who, according to government
concession, believed that he was possessing heroin, and not cocaine, would have been
given the much lengthier sentence for cocaine possession because his mistake as to
the type of drug was irrelevant, since the type of drug was not part of the crime.").
2001]
KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN
What if Mary only knows that she is carrying a drug, but
does not know which one? If the statute only requires knowl-
edge that one possesses a controlled substance, Mary's belief is
not opaque. If, however, the statute requires a belief that one is
carrying cocaine, and Mary only knows that she is carrying a
drug, we are back to a willful blindness question. Given Mary's
belief that she is carrying a drug (or even just something nefari-
ous), if she does not have a belief, but only a guess, as to the
item's identity, she is reckless. Whether that recklessness should
suffice for knowledge brings us to the problem of willful blind-
ness. But the preconscious is not figuring into this dilemma.'
It is not the case that Mary knows the content at a preconscious
level; rather, she suspects the content at a conscious or precon-
scious level. We will not resolve the problem by inquiring into
the depths of her mind, but by making a determination as to
how the concept of willful blindness is best captured.
V. CONCLUSION
Opaque recklessness, where the actor knowingly engages in
risky behavior but fails to think through the specific harms she
is risking, presents a problem for the current criminal law. De-
scriptively, the Model Penal Code fails to capture this concept.
Normatively, the Model Penal Code should.
Our current framework lacks the tools to solve this problem,
and conceptions of indifference lead us astray. Thus, we must
create a new mental state in the Model Penal Code, one that
captures the actor's conscious decision to engage in dangerous
behavior as well as the actor's preconscious appreciation of the
exact risk imposed. This new mental state is morally equivalent
to the Model Penal Code's conception of recklessness, because
when the actor decides to engage in dangerous conduct she not
only understands on a preconscious level the potential harms
involved, but her decision to engage in the risk necessarily in-
cludes this preconscious appreciation.
' See also supra section I.B (distinguishing opaque recklessness from willful blind-
ness).
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